Public Employees\u27 Right to Strike: Law and Experience by Malin, Martin H.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 26
1993 
Public Employees' Right to Strike: Law and Experience 
Martin H. Malin 
Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Martin H. Malin, Public Employees' Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 313 
(1993). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol26/iss2/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RIGHT TO STRIKE:
LAW AND EXPERIENCE
Martin H. Malin*
A very popular former United States president who won his
office in an Electoral College landslide once stated:
[M]ilitant tactics have no place in the functions of any
organization of Government employees .... [A] strike of
public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on
their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of Govern-
ment until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking
toward the paralysis of Government by those who have
sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable.'
That was not Ronald Reagan firing striking air traffic control-
lers in 1981. It was Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the same
president who signed the Wagner Act2 declaring the federal
policy of promoting collective bargaining and providing a
statutory right to strike in the private sector.
Although most states adhere to Roosevelt's philosophy and
prohibit public employee strikes, times have changed. In 1970,
Hawaii and Pennsylvania became the first states in the nation
to grant their public employees a statutory right to strike.3
Since then, courts in several jurisdictions have interpreted state
public employee collective bargaining statutes to provide for
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1. Letter from Franklin Roosevelt to the president, National Federation of Federal
Employees (August 16, 1937), quoted in Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 83
A.2d 482, 484 (Conn. 1951) (alteration in original).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988).
3. HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 89-1 to -20(1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-,2301
(1991).
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public employee strike rights.4 Two of the three most recent
jurisdictions to adopt comprehensive public employee collective
bargaining statutes, Illinois and Ohio, have granted public
employees the right to strike.5 In 1990, Alaska granted its
teachers a right to strike for a two-year experimental period.6
In 1992, the Alaska Legislature overrode the Governor's veto
and made that right permanent.7 Even a number of public
employers have voiced support for the right to strike as the
principal method of resolving impasses in public sector collective
bargaining.8
Nevertheless, the right to strike for public employees remains
highly controversial, even in those jurisdictions that recognize
it. In Pennsylvania, for example, opponents of the public
employees' right to strike have attacked the teachers' right to
strike as violative of the state constitution's guarantee of a
thorough and efficient system of public education.9 Pennsylva-
nia recently amended its statute, substantially restricting the
right of public school teachers to strike.' °
Furthermore, no consensus exists among the jurisdictions
that recognize a right to strike over how closely to regulate the
right. One significant issue is whether to require exhaustion of
a nonbinding fact-finding procedure as a precondition to a lawful
4. See County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n, Local
660, 699 P.2d 835, 849 (Cal.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995 (1985); Firefighters Local 1494
v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 586 P.2d 1346, 1358 (Idaho 1978); Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d
457, 459 (La. 1990); Montana v. Public Employees Craft Council, 529 P.2d 785, 787-88
(Mont. 1974).
5. 5 ILL. COMP STAT. act 315, § 17 (1992); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, § 13 (1992);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117 (Anderson 1991). The third state, New Mexico, does not
provide either a right to strike or a right to binding interest arbitration. The last step
in the New Mexico impasse resolution procedures is nonbinding fact-finding N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10-7D-18, -21 (Michie 1992). As developed at infra notes 56-62 and
accompanying text, reliance on nonbinding fact-finding is likely to lead to de facto
reliance on strikes and strike threats as the primary impasse resolution device.
6. ALASKA STAT. § 180 (Temporary & Special Acts 1990).
7. Alaska Legislature Overrides Veto of School Employee Right to Strike, 30 Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1458, at 454 (Mar. 30, 1992).
8. Se9 eg., QWG A OLSON Er A, SMKES AND STrE PENALTS IN THE PUMUC S C0R
FINAL REPORT PREPARED FOR U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR 392-93 (1981) (reporting that employers
generally preferred the right to strike over interest arbitration); Peter Feuille, Selected
Benefits and Costs of Compulsory Arbitration, 33 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REv. 64,68 & n.21
(1979) (collecting statements of employer sentiment preferring strikes to interest
arbitration); Job Sharing, Teacher Strikes Top Agenda at NSBA Convention, 1982 Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 960, at 17 (Apr. 26, 1982) (reporting that speakers at the
National School Boards Association convention advocated strikes over interest
arbitration).
9. See Gulnac v. South Butler County Sch. Dist., 587 A.2d 699 (Pa. 1991).
10. See infra notes 263-71 and accompanying text.
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strike. Where prestrike fact-finding is required, the parties
must present their positions regarding unresolved issues to a
neutral fact finder who holds a hearing and makes
recommendations for final settlement. The parties remain free
to accept or reject the recommendations."
Another significant issue that concerns public sector strikes
is whether, and under what conditions, to enjoin a lawful strike.
Some jurisdictions require a showing of a clear and present
danger to the public health and safety for an injunction to issue.
Others permit an injunction to issue upon a showing of a clear
and present danger to the public health, safety, or welfare. 2
The addition of strikes endangering the public welfare under the
latter standard greatly expands the number and types of lawful
strikes that are subject to injunction.
This Article analyzes the law of and experience with the
statutory right to strike in the public sector. Part I examines
the policy debate over whether public employees should have a
right to strike and concludes that reliance on the right to strike
is superior to other forms of collective-bargaining dispute
resolution in the public sector. The remainder of the Article
focuses in detail on the experiences in Illinois and Ohio since
those states legalized public employee strikes. The analysis is
supplemented with an examination of the experiences with
legalized strikes in Oregon and Pennsylvania. Part II compares
and contrasts the laws of these four jurisdictions regarding the
right to strike. Part III examines these states' experiences with
the right to strike, focusing on whether legalizing public
employee strikes leads to increased strike activity and on the
effects of requiring fact-finding as a precondition to a lawful
strike. Part IV considers the question of enjoining a lawful
public employee strike. The Article concludes that public
employees should have a statutory right to strike, that there
11. The public sector experience with prestrike fact-finding also may prove to be
significant in the private sector. During debates in the United States Senate over a bill
to prohibit the permanent replacement of private sector strikers, proponents of the bill
endorsed an amendment proposed by Senator Packwood which would have allowed
either party to request nonbinding fact-finding. An employer that refused a union
request for fact-finding or refused to comply with the fact finder's recommended
settlement would have been precluded from permanently replacing workers who
subsequently struck. Although the amendment failed to end the opposing senators'
filibuster, it likely will be resurrected in subsequent efforts to pass legislation
prohibiting permanent replacement of strikers. See Senate Fails to Invoke Cloture on
Striker Replacement Bills, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 114, at A-10 (June 12, 1992).
12. See infra notes 211-13, 245-47 and accompanying text.
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should be no requirement of fact-finding as a precondition to a
lawful strike, and that injunctions should be issued rarely, if
ever.
I. PUBLIC POLICY AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STRIKES
Although arguments have been made to the contrary, this
Article begins with the assumption that public policy favors
collective bargaining by public employees when a majority of
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit opt for union
representation. 13  Impasses in collective bargaining are
inevitable. Accordingly, jurisdictions that provide for public
employee collective bargaining have developed three approaches
to resolving such impasses. The first approach relies on the
threat or actual use of economic weapons, primarily the strike
or lockout, to motivate the parties to reach agreement. 4 The
second approach prohibits strikes, but provides for fact-finding
in the event of impasse. Under this approach, the parties
13. For conflicting views about the desirability of collective bargaining for public
employees, compare Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political
Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974) [hereinafter Summers, Public Employee
Bargaining], with Robert S. Summers,Public Sector Collective Bargaining Substantially
Diminishes Democracy, GOV'T UNION REV., Winter 1980, at 5. The law in the United
States reflects a clear policy choice favoring public employee collective bargaining. Most
jurisdictions grant collective bargaining rights by statute to at least some of their public
employees. The largest number of such jurisdictions do so through comprehensive public
employee labor relations acts. These include jurisdictions as diverse as California, CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-3510 (West 1980); the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-
601.2(a)(6) (1987); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.201 (Harrison 1981); Iowa, IOWA CODE
ANN. § 20.1 (West 1989); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-7D-1 to -26 (Michie 1992);
and New York, N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1983). Others grant specific groups
of employees, such as police, firefighters, or teachers, statutory bargaining rights. See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 25-5-3(b) (1982) (firefighters); IDAHO CODE § 33-1271 (1981)
(teachers) & § 44-1802 (1977) (firefighters); IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-3 (1976) (teachers); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-1 (West 1987) (police and firefighters). In many
jurisdictions without public employee collective bargaining laws, collective bargaining
is permissive at the option of the employer. See, e.g., Freeman v. Local 1802, 569 A.2d
1244 (Md. 1990); 1977 Ark. Att'y Gen. Op. 231 (No. 77-99). Only in a small minority
ofjurisdictions is collective bargaining by public employers illegal. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 95-98 (1989); Commonwealth v. County Bd., 232 S.E.2d 30, 40 (Va. 1977).
14. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.080 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-12 (1985); 5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. act 315, § 17 (1992); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, § 13 (1992); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 179A.18 (West Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-201 (1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 243.726(2) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1730 (1987). Ohio grants public employees the right to strike, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.03 (Anderson 1991), but prohibits lockouts. Id. § 4117.11(7).
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present their positions to a neutral fact finder who makes
findings and recommends a settlement, which the parties are
free to accept or reject as they see fit.' 5 The third approach
provides that the parties submit unresolved impasses to binding
arbitration. 6
A. Strikes
In the private sector, each party's ability to resort to economic
weapons provides the primary motivation for avoiding and
resolving bargaining impasses. The National Labor Relations
Act 7 expressly permits strikes by private sector employees.' 8
The Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to empower
private employers to defend against strikes by permanently
replacing the strikers 9 or to take the offensive by locking out
bargaining-unit employees.2" Although there is an ongoing
debate over whether the current regulation of economic weapons
has advantaged private sector employers inappropriately,2' the
debate's focus on the balance of economic power illustrates the
overwhelming acceptance of economic weapons as the bargaining
motivator of choice in the private sector.
The strike in the public sector differs markedly from its
private sector counterpart. Whereas the private sector strike
15. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4015 (Supp. 1992) (public school employees);
id. tit. 19, § 1615 (police and firefighters); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 447.403 (Harrison 1991);
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-13 (1976) (teachers).
16. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-276a (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (state
employees); id. § 7-473c (West 1989) (municipal employees); id. § 10-153f (West 1986
& Supp. 1992) (teachers); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (West 1989) (public employees); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) (public employees).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988).
18. Id. §§ 157, 163.
19. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
20. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
21. See, e.g., George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers:
The Law and Economics Approach, PROC. N.Y.U. 43RD ANN. NAT'L CONF. ON LAB. 109
(1990); Samuel Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 3 LAB. LAW. 897 (1987); Matthew
W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV.
547; Walter Kamiat, Strikers and Replacements: A Labor Union Perspective, PROC.
N.Y.U. 43RD ANN. NATL CONF. ON LAB. 23 (1990); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Legal
Regulation of Economic Weapons: A Comparative Perspective, PROC. N.Y.U. 43RD ANN.
NAT'L CONF. ON LAB. 79 (1990); Paul C. Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of
Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351 (1984);
William C. Zifchak, Strikers, Replacements, and S. 2112: Full Employment Law for
Organized Labor?, PROC. N.Y.U. 43RD ANN. NAT1L CONE. ON LAB. 53 (1990).
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is an economic weapon, the public sector strike is primarily a
political one.22 During a strike, the public employer continues
to collect taxes and other revenues and saves the wages it would
have paid to striking workers. Thus, unlike the private sector,
loss of revenue does not motivate a public employer to settle a
strike.23 The union's goal is to make the strike's interruption
of government services of sufficient political cost to motivate the
employer to settle on more favorable terms.
Because of the political nature of the public employee strike,
some have argued that a right to strike in public employment
distorts the political process.24 In their view, public employees'
wages and other terms and conditions of employment involve
22. For a leading public employee unionist's discussion of the strike as a political
weapon, see Albert L. Shanker, Why Teachers Need the Right to Strike, 96 MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Sept. 1973, at 48.
23. OLSON ETAL., supra note 8, at 76. This may not be the case with school districts
whose states require them to offer a minimum number of days of pupil instruction to
gain state aid. In such cases, the district will lose revenues if it does not make up the
days lost to a strike; if it does make up the days, it will not save teacher salaries. When
state aid comprises a small portion of a district's revenue, however, the district can profit
financially from a strike by not making up lost days, because the wage savings will more
than offset the loss of state aid. OTTo A. DAVIS & BEN FISCHER, TEACHER LABOR RELATIONS
IN PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A RESEARCH SuDY 54-67 (1987), OLSON ET AL, supm note
8, at 170.
Many have observed that when school districts make up days lost to a strike, striking
employees, usually teachers, suffer little or no monetary loss as a result of the strike.
This encourages teachers to strike and explains why teacher strikes constitute the
largest proportion of public sector strikes. See, e.g., DAVIS & FISCHER, supra, at 51-57;
PAUL F. GERHART & JOHN E. DROTNING, A SIX STATE STUDY OF IMPASSE PROCEDURES IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR, FINAL REPORT 181-83 (1980); OLSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 160-67
(analyzing the experience in Pennsylvania); id. at 380-88 (studying the impact of a state
aid formula generally); R. Theodore Clark, Jr., A Discussion, .33 LAB. L.J. 508, 511
(1982); Edward Montgomery & Mary Ellen Benedict, The Impact of Bargainer Experience
on Teacher Strikes, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 380,386 (1989); CraigA. Olson, TheRole
of Rescheduled School Days in Teacher Strikes, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 515 (1984).
But see Robert E. Doherty, Public Policy and the Right to Strike, in PORTRAIT OF A
PRocESS-CoLLEcrIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 251,256 (Muriel K Gibbons et
al. eds., 1979) (attributing the dominance of teacher strikes to a greater number of
noneconomic policy issues, a larger number of teacher bargaining units, and a more
frequent turnover of chief negotiators than in other public employee bargaining units).
The policy issues involved in the question ofrescheduling strike days in public education
are beyond the scope of this Article.
24. The most forceful argument from this perspective is provided in HARRY H.
WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1971). See also Arvid
Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 943,
956-59 (1969); T. Merritt Bumpass, Jr. & Keith A. Ashmus, Public Sector Bargaining
in a Democracy--An Assessment of the Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Law,
33 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 593 (1984); NEw YORK GOVERNOR'S COMMrrEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT (1966), quoted in Kurt L. Hanslowe & John L. Acierno, The Law
and Theory of Strikes by Government Employees, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1055, 1063 (1982).
Right to Strike
political questions.2" Working conditions, such as class size,
school curriculum, and whether civilian boards will review
allegations of police misconduct, also raise questions of public
policy. Even basic bargainable issues such as wages raise
questions about the allocation of scarce public resources. Public
employees comprise only one of the interest groups seeking to
influence official action. Collective bargaining, however,
provides public employees an avenue of access to public officials
that is not available to other interest groups. A right to strike
distorts the political process by enabling public employees to
exploit their exclusive avenue of access with a weapon that
greatly magnifies their political power. When such employees
strike, a large segment of the elected officials' constituency will
clamor for a quick settlement and often force the officials to cave
in to union demands without sufficient regard for the costs of
the settlement.26 This danger is greatest when the services
which the public employees provide are essential and their
interruption will impose great costs on the public, but it also is
present when service interruptions will result in only major
inconvenience. In summary, the right to strike distorts the
political process by excessively empowering public employee
unions in a decision-making arena from which other interest
groups have been excluded.27
The scenario that politically spineless officials cower to the
strike threats of overly powerful public employee unions is
only one theoretical vision. Other commentators have
disputed some of the premises of this theory. They have
observed that the public is capable of forgoing many
governmental services temporarily28 and that substitutes may
be available to provide even the most essential services during
25. See WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 24, at 24-29, 167-70, 202.
26. Id. at 25.
27. See Donald A. Dripps, New Directions for the Regulation of Public Employee
Strikes, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590 (1985). Professor Donald Dripps has updated these
political process concerns. He has rejected the traditional view of how public employee
strikes distort the democratic process and has applied public choice theory to suggest
that the structure of public sector bargaining and the strike weapon be regulated to
counterbalance what otherwise would be excessive union influence upon public officials.
Id.
28. See, e.g., John F. Burton, Jr. & Charles Krider, The Role and Consequences of
Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418, 426 (1970); Bernard D. Meltzer & Cass
R. Sunstein, Public Employee Strikes, Executive Discretion, and the Air Traffic
Controllers, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 731, 737 (1983); Clyde W. Summers, Bargaining in the
Government's Business: Principles and Politics, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 265, 277-78 (1987).
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a strike.29 They also have questioned whether the assertion of
economic power in a political dispute truly is inconsistent with
the democratic process30
An equally credible theory views public employees as
inherently disadvantaged in the political process with respect
to issues that affect them more directly than other interest
groups. Members of the public are users or purchasers of the
employees' services. As users, they desire greater quantity and
quality; as purchasers, they desire lower costs. The users and
purchasers outnumber the employees and accordingly have
greater combined political clout. Because labor costs are the
dominant part of most governmental budgets, public employees
demanding pay raises or other concessions which would raise
labor costs are at a disadvantage vis-&-vis all other interest
groups in the political budget-making process. Consequently,
they need the special avenue of access to public officials that
collective bargaining provides.
3 1
29. See Dripps, supra note 27, at 597-98. The Illinois Legislature recognized the
distinction between the essentiality of the service and the essentiality of the strikers
for providing the service. The Illinois statutes permit the enjoining of lawful strikes
that pose a clear and present danger to the public health and safety, see infra notes
123-128 and accompanying text, but their legislative histories make it clear that in
deciding whether such a danger exists, the labor boards and the courts must consider
the availability of alternatives to ordering the strikers back to work, such as
temporarily subcontracting the "essential" service. See Martin H. Malin,
Implementing the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, 61 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 101,
132 & n.124 (1985) (citing and discussing Illinois legislative history). But see HPERB
v. United Pub. Workers, Local 646, 667 P.2d 783 (Haw. 1983) (affirming an HPERB
finding that the availability of private contractors or striker replacements was limited
in light of strike pressures and tensions).
30. See, e.g., Burton & Krider, supra note 28, at 428-31; Hanslowe & Acierno,
supra note 24, at 1055, 1072-73; Summers, supra note 28, at 275.
31. See generally Summers, Public Employee Bargaining, supra note 13. T. Merritt
Bumpass, Jr. and Keith A. Ashmus provide an example of how collective bargaining
responds to public employees' inherent political disadvantages:
Assume that a city has a practice of using two police officers per patrol car. A
crime wave leads to a public outcry for a more visible police presence. In the
absence of any bargaining impediment, one possible response of the city would be
the deployment of a number of one-officer patrol cars. While the police would
perhaps object, the citizenry would have the ability to urge this approach on their
elected officials as being preferable to raising taxes for new police officers....
This example illustrates why bargaining is needed, as well as why it is
undemocratic. The choice of one-person patrols maximizes police presence and
minimizes costs to taxpayers; it may also have an adverse impact on the safety
of police officers. The voting public may "undervalue" police safety and thus be
willing to yield it in exchange for more police visibility and no new taxes ....
Bumpass & Ashmus, supra note 24, at 637 & n.202.
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Viewed in this light, public employee strikes do not distort
the political process. Rather, public employees strike against
the very interest groups-the users and purchasers of their
services-against whom they must compete in the political
process. Moreover, if public officials make it clear that the
levels of services and taxes are at stake in a strike, public
employee unions will not retain an undue advantage because
the taxpayers and service users outnumber them at the polls.32
The true test of all theories of the effects of public employee
strikes on the democratic process lies in the actual experience
with such work stoppages. Measured by this standard, the
theory that public employee strikes distort the democratic
process does not fare well. Public employers frequently resist
public employee demands, even when those demands are
backed by work stoppages. Such resistance is quite common in
small conservative communities where a homogeneous
population reacts negatively to a public employee strike.33 Stiff
resistance also is common in large urban areas.34
32. Summers, supra note 28, at 278-79. It is important to note that Professors
Wellington and Winter, who are cited universally for the view that public sector strikes
distort the democratic process, did not advocate the total ban of such job actions. They
expressly cautioned against drawing such a conclusion from their stated concerns:
All this may seem to suggest that it is the strike weapon ... that cannot be
transplanted to the public sector. This is an oversimplification, however. It is the
combination of the strike and the typical municipal political process, including the
usual methods for raising revenue. One solution, of course, might well be a ban
on strikes, if it could be made effective. But that is not the sole alternative, for
there may be ways in which municipal political structures can be changed so as
to make cities less vulnerable to strikes and to reduce the potential power of
public employee unions to tolerable levels.
WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 24, at 31-32. Their recommendations for reconciling
public employee strikes with the democratic process included strike contingency
planning by public officials, provisions for partial strikes rather than the complete
suspension of certain services, and reforming the revenue process to make the costs of
a labor settlement and their relationship to taxes and budgeting more visible. Id. at
196-201.
33. See Thomas A. Kochan, Dynamics of Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector,
in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING 150, 167 (Benjamin Aaron et al. eds., 1979). Professors
Wellington and Winter acknowledged that the strike weapon would not necessarily
threaten the democratic process in such communities. See WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra
note 24, at 32.
34. See Kochan, supra note 33, at 167-68 (discussing examples from Buffalo,
Yonkers, San Francisco, Atlanta, and Chicago); Craig A- Olson, The Use of the Legal
Right to Strike in the Public Sector, 33 LAB. L.J. 494, 495 (1982) (observing the overall
level of resistance by public sector managers to union work stoppages and describing
such resistance in Philadelphia and Minnesota).
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For several reasons, public officials do not cave in
automatically to fears of strike-induced political fallout. First,
experience demonstrates that avoiding or ending the strike at
any cost may be politically expedient in the short term, but
politically costly in the long run. During the 1970s, for
example, several school districts in Ohio agreed to contracts
with wage scales that exceeded the districts' revenues, only to
have them backfire when voters refused to approve the property
taxes needed to fund the agreements. As a result, the school
districts were forced to close schools prior to the end of the fall
semester because they ran out of money.35 The officials who
conceded to union demands may have incurred greater political
wrath from the early school closings than they would have faced
in a teacher strike. Many public officials have learned this
lesson well. When teacher strikes force schools to close, it is
common for the local community to demand that management
solve the problem so that schools can reopen while showing
little concern for the substance of the underlying labor
dispute.36 Nevertheless, management has been willing to
withstand the political heat and resist the temptation to settle
at any cost.
37
Public employers have become quite resourceful at resisting
strikes. 38 For example, they have procured short-term substi-
tutes for interrupted services.39 On rare occasions, they also
have permanently replaced striking employees.4 ° They have
35. OLSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 301.
36. See Charles R. Perry, Teacher Bargaining: The Experience in Nine Systems,
33 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 10 (1979).
37. Id. Perry also found that although there was a tendency by state and city
officials to enter negotiations in the early years of collective bargaining and to broker
settlements by promising the school district more revenues, such activity declined
markedly after 1970. Id.
38. For a discussion by an elected official of how a municipal government
sucessfully resisted a strike, see Mary W. Henderson, How to Deal with a Strike as an
Elected Official, in LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AMONG GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 68
(Harry Kershen ed., 1983).
39. Feuille, supra note 8, at 67.
40. See Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482
(1976); Rockwell v. Board of Educ., 227 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. 1975), appeal dismissed, 427
U.S. 901 (1976). The most visible example of this was President Reagan's dismissal and
replacement of striking air traffic controllers in 1981. The experience with the air
traffic controllers' strike undercuts the fear of strikes even by employees considered
essential to the public health and safety. See Hanslowe & Acierno, supra note 24, at
1069-71 (noting that not all public services necessarily are essential). For a discussion
of the legal issues involving the replacement of striking public employees in states
322
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resorted to less traditional measures in order to pressure
striking employees to return to work.41
The political effects of a public employee strike also may
deter some unions from striking. For example, the frequency
of teacher strikes declined in Wisconsin while the legislature
was considering a bill that would provide interest arbitration,
in part because the unions feared the potential political
backlash from a rash of strikes.42 Similarly, few strikes
occurred in Indiana while that state's supreme court was
considering the constitutionality of the state public sector
bargaining law.43 In Iowa, when a local teachers' union
threatened to strike after an unfavorable interest arbitration
award, the union's state affiliate intervened and convinced the
local not to strike because the state affiliate feared political
backlash directed at the arbitration statute."
Experience shows that unions are not benefitting inordinately
from an excessively powerful strike weapon. For example, a
study of teacher strikes found that, generally, "strike use affects
salary changes but not salary levels."45 This finding led to the
conclusion that teacher strikes generally are defensive in
nature.46 Another study found that noneducation local govern-
ment employees tended to strike when their salaries were above
average, but that their strikes tended to last longer than other
groups of public employees, thereby indicating strong employer
where strikes are legal, see Rona Pietrzak, Some Reflections on Mackay's Application
to Legal Economic Strikes in the Public Sector: An Analysis of State Collective
Bargaining Statutes, 68 OR. L. REv. 87 (1989).
41. During the 1967 New York City teachers' strike, for example, draft boards even
began reviewing the male strikers' draft-exempt status. See Boyd Hight, Teachers,
Bargaining and Strikes: Perspective from the Swedish Experience, 15 UCLA L. REV.
840, 851-52 (1968). The final settlement gave the union very little beyond the
employer's final prestrike offer. Id. at 852.
42. OLSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 244.
43. Id. at 352.
44. GERHART & DROTNING, supra note 23, at 174. The strike also may affect the
internal politics of the union. For example, a prepared employer may take a strike to
bring a militant faction within the union back to reality. See id. at 143.
45. John T. Delaney, Strikes, Arbitration, and Teacher Salaries: A Behavioral
Analysis, 36 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 431, 442 (1983) (finding [tihe use of the strike
leads to salary increases that are significantly above those in nonstriking districts, but
[that] strike use does not cause the resulting salary levels to be higher than those
voluntarily negotiated in other districts").
46. Id.
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resistance.47 A significant number of public employee strikes
end without any agreement at all.48
Moreover, the union wage effect-the impact that unions
have on wage increases-is less in the public sector than it is
in the private sector.4 9 There is also reason to believe that the
union wage effect in the public sector results more from the
availability of interest arbitration than from the strike weapon.
In Canada, for example, where the right to strike is more
prevalent in the public sector, unions achieve greater wage
increases through interest arbitration than through threatened
and actual strikes.'0 Perhaps this is because public officials
find interest arbitration more politically expedient than
operating under a strike threat. An employer that loses in
arbitration can avoid accountability by blaming the arbitrator.
Despite this advantage, many public employers prefer to thke
the heat of a strike rather than to operate under interest
arbitration.5 ' This preference suggests that they do not believe
that political pressure will cause them to cave in to excessive
union demands.
To the extent that public employee strikes may distort the
democratic process, legalizing them actually may reduce the
distortion. When public employees strike illegally, employers
may seek injunctions.52  Two reasons typically motivate
employers to do so. First, seeking an injunction responds to the
political clamor to "do something." Second, the injunction
petition usually brings the judge in to mediate the dispute.53
Mediation, backed by the court's power, may succeed in
resolving the impasse.5
47. James L. Perry, Public Policy and Public Employee Strikes, 16 INDUS. REL. 273,
277 (1977).
48. Kochan, supra note 33, at 168.
49. Feuille, supra note 8, at 66.
50. Janet Currie & Sheena McConnell, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector:
The Effect of Legal Structure on Dispute Costs and Wages, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 693
(1991).
51. See OLSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 388.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 653 F.2d
1134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Anderson Fed'n of Teachers Local
519 v. School City, 251 N.E.2d 15 (Ind.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1969); City of Dover
v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1312, 322 A.2d 918 (N.H. 1974); Board of
Educ. v. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n, 247 A.2d 867 (N.J. 1968). But see School Dist. v.
Holland Educ. Ass'n, 157 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 1968).
53. See infra notes 333-39 and accompanying text.
54. GERHART & DRoTNING, supra note 23, at 138-39.
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If, however, the judge is unable to resolve the dispute, or the
judge surprises the parties and issues the injunction without
first mediating, the union may respond by defying the court's
back-to-work order. The ensuing fining or incarceration of
otherwise law-abiding civil servants raises the political stakes
considerably.
On the other hand, legalizing public employee strikes
deprives employers of the quick fix of seeking an injunction.
This may lead to public recognition and acceptance of occasional
interruptions of governmental services as a cost of the collective
bargaining system, just as such interruptions are accepted in
the private sector. Such recognition helps to counterbalance
union power, encourages meaningful bargaining, and
discourages strikes.55
The theory that a right to strike in the public sector distorts
democratic processes remains just that-a theory. It does not
justify rejection of the right to strike. Before concluding that
reliance on the right to strike is an appropriate policy, however,
it is necessary to evaluate the two alternatives: fact-finding
and interest arbitration.
B. Fact-Finding and Strike Prohibitions
Jurisdictions which prohibit strikes may provide for fact-
finding in the event of a bargaining impasse. Fact-finding may
take many forms along a continuum from fact finder as
supermediator to fact finder as pure adjudicator. Under the
supermediator model, fact finders wield their power to adjudi-
cate the dispute in order to move the parties toward settlement.
The goal is to have the parties resolve the dispute by an
agreement which then may be embodied either in a bilateral
agreement or, for political reasons, may be issued as the fact
finder's recommendations. Under the pure adjudicator model,
the fact finder holds a formal hearing and issues findings of fact
and recommendations for settlement.56
55. Such a potential scenario is suggested in Charles B. Craver, Public Sector
Impasse Resolution Procedures, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 779, 805 (1984).
56. For further discussion of these two models, see GERHART & DROTNING, supra note
23, at 108-12. See also R.L. JACKSON, FACT-FINDING UNDER THE SCHOOL BOARDS AND
TEACHERS COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ACT OF ONTARIO 28-38 (1988).
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In theory, fact-finding can settle bargaining disputes that the
parties could not resolve through bilateral agreement. The fact
finder's neutrality ensures that the recommendations are
credible and public pressure prods recalcitrant parties to accept
the recommendations.5 7 Fact-finding, however, lacks finality.
By its nature, fact-finding is nonbinding and either side may
reject the fact finder's recommendations with impunity. When
rejection occurs, statutes that rely on fact-finding58 leave the
parties without any method to settle the dispute. The logical
tactic to which these parties will turn is the use of economic
weapons.59
Experience with fact-finding has demonstrated that it
functions poorly as an impasse-resolution device. The absence
of finality greatly reduces the risk of proceeding to fact-finding.
Consequently, it is common for parties not to engage in much
meaningful bargaining prior to the fact-finding hearing.6"
When fact-finding is first introduced in a state, experience
with it tends to be positive. After a few years, however, fact-
finding tends to be replaced by illegal strikes to resolve
bargaining impasses. Even when the parties settle or accept
the fact finder's recommendations, their motivation to do so is
more likely to be fear of an illegal strike than pressure from
public opinion. 61 Thus, fact-finding appears to suffer from a
57. Harold R. Newman, Mediation and Fact-Finding, in PORTRAIT OF A
PROCESS-COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, supra note 23, at 204.
58. See supra note 15.
59. See Theodore W. Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv. 931,
934 (1969); Jean T. McKelvey, Fact-Finding in Public Employment Disputes: Promise
or Illusion?, 22 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 528, 531 (1969).
60. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 56, at 54-62; William R. Word, Implications for
Fact Finding: The New Jersey Experience, in IMPASSE AND GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION 9
(Harry Kershen ed., 1977) [hereinafter Word, Implications for Fact Finding]; William
R. Word, Factfinding in Public Employee Negotiations, 95 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 1972,
at 60, 61 [hereinafter Word, Factfinding in Public Employee Negotiations] (conducting
a survey of negotiating parties and fact finders in New York and Wisconsin which
revealed that, in most cases, progress prior to the initiation of fact-finding was
insubstantial and that two-thirds of the parties did not regard the initiation of fact-
finding as risky); see also GERHART & DROTNING, supra note 23, at 112 (observing that
fact-finding may inhibit progress in negotiations because it chills the mediator rather
than the parties).
61. See OLSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 128 (noting that interviews with parties in
New York revealed that fact-finding was not effective in resolving disputes); Karen S.
Gallagher & Donald L. Robson, Fact-Finding in Indiana: A Study of Fact-Finding
Frequency and Acceptance as an Impasse Resolution Procedure in Public School
Negotiations, 12 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUB. SECTOR 153,163-64 (1983) (finding
that between 1975 and 1978, fact-finding use and acceptance declined markedly, with
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"half-life effect." As the parties use it, they become disen-
chanted with it and increasingly ignore it, relying instead on
strikes and strike threats. As one commentator concludes, the
"half life" of fact-finding in the public sector appears to be
"rather short."62
Unions do not refrain from striking merely because the strike
is illegal. Prohibitions on public employee strikes also raise the
potential costs of striking to unions and employees. The
increased costs often lead the union to reduce its final prestrike
offer below what it would have been had the strike been legal.
If the increased costs bring the union's offer from a point above
the maximum level that the employer finds acceptable to a
point below it, the strike prohibition will have prevented a
strike.63
Strike prohibitions, however, also affect employer
calculations. Each side's final offer is affected directly not only
by its estimate of its own strike costs, but also by its estimate
of its opponent's strike costs. Recognizing this, parties
frequently misrepresent their strike costs as lower than what
they actually are." Opposing parties, recognizing the
probability of such misrepresentations, often discount the
information they receive from the other side.65
In jurisdictions where strikes are illegal, employers will value
the union's strike costs higher than if the strikes were legal and
will reduce their final offers accordingly. Thus, the strike
prohibition may reduce the employer's final offer to the same
extent that it reduced the union's final offer, leaving the parties
as far apart as they would have been had strikes been legal.
When this happens, the strike prohibition has not narrowed the
differences between the parties' positions and does not reduce
the likelihood of a strike.
a corresponding increase in strikes); Word, Implications for Fact Finding, supra note
60, at 9 (concluding that in New Jersey, there was a high rate of rejection of fact-finder
recommendations, but that strike threats produced bilateral agreements); Word,
Factfinding in Public Employee Negotiations, supra note 60, at 60, 63-64 (noting that
a survey of parties and fact finders in New York and Wisconsin revealed that in 80%
of the cases, public opinion had no or only a slight effect on the parties' positions); see
also McKelvey, supra note 59, at 540 (reviewing fact-finding experiences in Connecticut,
Michigan, New York, and Wisconsin and suggesting that employers' fears of a strike
motivated concessions and acceptance of fact-finder recommendations).
62. THoMAS A KOCHAN, COLu&'ivE BARGAINING AND INDSITAL RELAIONS 293 (1980).
63. OLSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 87-88.
64. Id. at 84-87.
65. Id.
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The combination of misrepresentations of strike costs and
discounting the other side's representations may lead employers
to overvalue the strike prohibition's effect on the union's strike
costs. Under these circumstances, because the employer will
reduce its final offer to a greater extent than the union, the
strike prohibition will have the ironic effect of exacerbating the
parties' differences and increasing the probability of a strike.6
Most studies of the effect of legal policy on strike activity
compare aggregate strike data by state, categorizing the states
by legal policy. Their results are inconsistent.67  The most
comprehensive study of the impact of legal policy on public
sector strike activity covered experiences in seven states during
the 1970s.68 The study found that the differences in the
probabilities of strikes occurring in Pennsylvania, where they
were legal, and Ohio and Illinois, where they were illegal at the
time, were insignificant. 69
The one state where a strike prohibition appeared to deter
strikes significantly was New York.7" New York's Taylor Law71
provides for several strike penalties, including suspension of the
union's dues checkoff and a penalty of two days' pay for each
day an employee is on strike. The employer collects the
two-for-one penalties,72 which are imposed in the overwhelming
66. Id. at 89-90.
67. See, e.g., Antone Aboud & Sanford F. Schram, Public Policy and Public Sector
Strike Behavior, 13 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUB. SECTOR 109,114 (1984) (finding
that strikes typically lasted longer in right-to-strike states than elsewhere, and
suggesting that shorter strike lengths in earlier years in right-to-strike states may be
explained by the proximity in time to the passage of the right-to-strike legislation);
John F. Burton, Jr. & Charles E. Krider, The Incidence of Strikes in Public
Employment, in LABOR IN THE PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT SECTORS 135, 171 (Daniel S.
Hamermesh ed., 1975) (finding no significant relationship between legal policy and
strike incidence, but not testing for a relationship between strike legality and strike
incidence); Dane M. Partridge, The Effect of Public Policy on Strike Activity in the
Public Sector, 19 J. COLLECmVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUB. SECTOR 87, 95 (1990) (finding strikes
to be significantly more probable in right-to-strike states than elsewhere); Perry, supra
note 47, at 278 (finding strike legalization to be significantly related to strike incidence
for some groups of public employees, but not for others); Andrew R. Weintraub & Robert
F. Thornton, Why Teachers Strike: The Economic and Legal Determinants, 5 J.
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUB. SECTOR 193,204 (1976) (finding strikes to be more likely
in states that have legislation encouraging collective bargaining).
68. OLSON ET AL., supra note 8.
69. Id. at 352.
70. Id. at 127, 352; Alan Balfour & Alexander B. Holmes, The Effectiveness of No
Strike Laws for Public School Teachers, 10 J. COLLECTvE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUB. SECTOR 133,
142 (1981).
71. N.Y. CIrV. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1983).
72. Id. § 210(g).
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majority of strikes.7" The two-for-one penalty appears to be the
most significant sanction in the New York law.74 It not only
raises the union's and employees' strike costs substantially, but
it lowers the employer's strike costs as well through the receipt
of the funds that the penalty generates. 75  This strike
deterrence is achieved, however, at substantial cost to the
bargaining process. The impact on the parties' strike costs
creates a situation in which the union's bargaining power is
eroded sufficiently that it has no choice but to concede to the
employer because of the union's strong need to avoid a strike.76
Thus, artificial strike prohibitions do not prevent strikes
unless the penalties are designed in such a way as to distort
the bargaining process, making it so one-sided that the union
almost always concedes. Fact-finding, because of its lack of
finality, does not provide a reliably effective device for resolving
the inevitable bargaining impasses.77 As it turns out, states
that ostensibly rely on fact-finding actually rely on illegal
strikes to settle bargaining impasses. Many of these states
realize this, as evidenced by statutes that provide only fact-
finding for most public employees, but that provide interest
arbitration for police and firefighters, the two groups of public
employees whose strikes would pose the greatest immediate
danger to life and property.78 Because interest arbitration
contains the finality that fact-finding lacks, it has greater
promise as a strike substitute.
73. OLSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 118-19.
74. Id. at 128-29.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 90, 129.
77. The Washington Supreme Court recently recognized the importance of finality
in impasse resolution tools. In Municipality of Metro. Seattle v. Public Employment
Relations Comm'n, 826 P.2d 158 (Wash. 1992), the court upheld the authority of the
Washington Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) to order interest
arbitration as a remedy in extreme cases of employer refusals to bargain in good faith.
The court observed that, because of the absence of finality in Washington's statutory
impasse procedures, an employer could refuse to bargain in good faith with de facto
impunity. See id. at 165-66. To avoid such a situation, the court reasoned, PERC must
be able to impose interest arbitration to remedy extreme recidivist bad-faith bargaining.
Id. at 166-67.
78. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 150E, § 9 & note (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp.
1992) (providing fact-finding for most public employees and interest arbitration for
police and firefighters); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(3), (4) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993)
(providing fact-finding for most public employees, with the ultimate determination to
be made by the employer's legislative body in the event of a rejection of the fact finder's
recommendations, and interest arbitration for police and firefighters); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 41.56.430-.450, 41.59.120 (West 1991) (providing fact-finding for teachers and
interest arbitration for police and firefighters).
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C. Interest Arbitration
Although fact-finding may be rejected because it fails to
provide a practical alternative to strikes, the same cannot be
done with interest arbitration. Interest arbitration almost
completely eliminates strikes 79 and renders strike penalties
irrelevant.8 0 Thus, interest arbitration is the primary policy
alternative to legalizing strikes in the public sector.
Unlike a strike, where employees lose wages and employers
suffer service interruptions, the primary costs that the parties
face in interest arbitration are likely to be legal fees. Moreover,
union and public officials face few political risks in interest
arbitration. Whereas their constituencies will hold them
accountable for results reached in bargaining under a strike
threat and for the consequences of a strike, officials on both
sides of the bargaining table can avoid accountability for
unfavorable results in interest arbitration simply by blaming
the arbitrator.8 Most of the debate over interest arbitration,
therefore, focuses on whether its reduced costs have a "chilling
effect" or "narcotic effect" on the bargaining process.
79. The evidence is overwhelming that strikes are extremely rare when interest
arbitration is provided. See, e.g., OLSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 353-60 (comparing New
York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin with Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana during 1975 and
1976 and finding that among police and firefighters, strikes were 3 to 15 times more
likely in the absence of interest arbitration); Currie & McConnell, supra note 50, at 706,
714 (studying interest arbitration in Canada); Feuille, supra note 8, at 65 (noting that
binding arbitration almost guaranteed the absence of strikes); Casey Ichniowski,
Arbitration and Police Bargaining: Prescriptions for the Blue Flu, 21 INDUS. REL. 149,
158 (1982) (studying police strikes); Charles M. Rehmus, Binding Arbitration in the
Public Sector, 98 MONTHLY LAB. REv., Apr. 1975, at 53,54 [hereinafter Rehmus, Binding
Arbitration] (noting the substantial reduction of strikes in Michigan, Minnesota,
Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin following the implementation of binding interest
arbitration); Charles M. Rehmus, Interest Arbitration, in PORTRAIT OF A
PROCESS--COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, supra note 23, at 209,214
[hereinafter Rehmus, Interest Arbitration]; Hoyt N. Wheeler, An Analysis of Fire
Fighter Strikes, 26 LAB. L.J. 17, 18 (1975).
80. OLSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 360-62 (finding that strikes in units subject to
interest arbitration were more frequent in New York than in comparable units in
Pennsylvania, even though New York imposed tougher strike penalties, suggesting that
penalties have no significant effect when interest arbitration is available).
81. Occasionally, ajurisdiction attempts to provide some measure of accountability
by allowing the employer's governing body to reject an interest arbitration award by a
supermajority vote. See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 315, § 14(n) (1992). Substantial
disincentives, such as a requirement that the employer assume the full costs of
subsequent arbitration proceedings, often accompany the rejection option. Id. § 14(o).
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The "chilling effect" refers to the alleged tendency of parties
to avoid realistic bargaining and proceed to arbitration. Debate
over the chilling effect focuses on statistics showing the
percentage of negotiations resulting in arbitration awards.82
Interpretating this data is comparable to deciding whether a
glass is half-full or half-empty. Those who see the glass as half-
full observe that bilateral agreements are reached in a majority
of cases and conclude that there is little or no chilling effect.8 3
Those who see the glass as half-empty observe that arbitration
usage rates are considerably higher than strike rates 4 and
point to comparative studies which show that impasse is far
more probable when bargaining under the threat of arbitration
than when bargaining under the threat of a strike. 5
The "narcotic effect" refers to the alleged tendency of interest
arbitration to be addictive. The debate over the narcotic effect
focuses on the probability that negotiations which end in
arbitration in a given year are likely to end in arbitration in
82. Several commentators have examined interest arbitration usage rates involving
a variety of types of public employees and jurisdictions. See RICHARD A. LESTER, LABOR
ARBITRATION IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1984) (giving usage rates for various states
and New York City); Peter Feuille, Reconciling Interest[s] in Interest Arbitration:
Facilitation and Adjudication, ILL. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL. REP., Spring 1992, at 1, 2
(estimating that eight percent of Illinois police and firefighter negotiations in 1991
ended in arbitration awards); Rehmus, Binding Arbitration, supra note 79, at 54
(providing usage rates ranging from 30% of Pennsylvania public safety employees to
7.5% of employees in New York City and Nevada); Weiler, supra note 21, at 380-81
n.95. Weiler indicates usage rates ranging from four percent for all employees in Iowa
over a two-year period to 36% for teachers in British Columbia over a 21-year period.
The Iowa rate may be deceptively small, however, because under Iowa's scheme, the
parties first must use fact-finding. IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.21 (West 1988). In the ensuing
arbitration, the arbitrator must award the last offer of one of the parties or the
settlement recommended by the fact finder. Id. § 20.22(11). Arbitrators overwhelm-
ingly select the fact finder's recommendations. See Daniel C. Gallagher et al., Who
Wins at Fact-Finding: Union, Management or Fact-Finder?, PROC. 34TH ANN. MTG.,
INDUS. REL. REs. ASS'N, at 273 (1979). Consequently, many impasse proceedings
terminate with fact-finding, which becomes the de facto arbitration.
83. See, e.g., Robert G. Howlett, Contract Negotiation Arbitration in the Public
Sector, 42 U. CN. L. REv. 47, 57-61 (1973); Arlyne K. Liebeskind, Compulsory
Arbitration for Public Safety Services in New Jersey-The First Three Years, 16 J.
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUB. SECTOR 343, 357 (1987) (observing that usage in New
Jersey public safety units declined from 53% of negotiations in 1978 to 32% in 1980 and
concluding that arbitration has no chilling effect).
84. See, e.g., Rehmus, Interest Arbitration, supra note 79, at 221 (estimating a 10%
chilling effect); Weiler, supra note 21, at 380-81 (citing several studies).
85. LESTER, supra note 82, at 65 (comparing the experiences of essential services
units in Minnesota, which must rely on interest arbitration, with other units that have
a choice of striking or engaging in interest arbitration); Currie & McConnell, supra note
50, at 713.
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future years. The results of empirical studies vary, at times
because different statistical techniques are applied to the same
data. 6
The debate over whether arbitration chills bilateral agree-
ments or is habit forming misses the point. Comparing the
likelihood of bilateral agreement under arbitration to the
likelihood of bilateral agreement under the threat of a strike is
like comparing apples with oranges. Arbitration substitutes
adjudication for economic and political power as the means of
setting public employees' terms and conditions of employment.
Parties negotiating under the threat of a strike take their
positions in light of their political and economic power and the
importance of the disputed issues to their constituents. Parties
negotiating under the threat of arbitration base their positions
on the adjudicatory strength of their arguments. Thus, it is not
surprising that overall outcomes of bilateral agreements in
arbitration states do not differ significantly from the outcomes
imposed by arbitrators in those states.8 7 It is the presence of
arbitration rather than its use that is significant.
Accordingly, the key issue is whether adjudication is a
preferable method for setting terms and conditions of
employment in the public sector.88 As the following analysis
demonstrates, it is-not.
86. For three different interpretations of the same data, see Richard J. Butler &
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Estimating the Narcotic Effect of Public Sector Impasse
Procedures, 35 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3 (1981); James R. Chelius & Marian N. Extejt,
The Narcotic Effect of Impasse Resolution Procedures, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 629
(1985); Thomas A. Kochan & Jean Baderschneider, Dependence on Impasse Procedures:
Police and Firefighters in New York State, 31 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 431 (1978). See
also Janet Currie, Who Uses Interest Arbitration? The Case of British Columbia's
Teachers 1947-1981,42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 363, 377 (1989) (finding that units that
went to arbitration in the previous round were 10% more likely to go to arbitration in
the current round of negotiations, and concluding that this strongly suggests a narcotic
effect).
87. See, e.g., Richard H. Bezdek & David W. Ripley, Compulsory Arbitration Versus
Negotiation for Public Safety Employees: The Michigan Experience, in IMPASSE AND
GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION, supra note 60, at 47 (finding no significant difference in wages
negotiated by the parties or awarded by arbitrators in Michigan public safety
bargaining units); Delaney, supra note 45, at 433 & nn.12, 13 (noting that the
availability rather than the use of arbitration affects teachers' wages); Peter Feuille &
John T. Delaney, Collective Bargaining, Interest Arbitration and Police Salaries, 39
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 228, 234 (1986) (suggesting that the availability of arbitration
has a modest effect on salaries, but that the use of arbitration has no significant effect
on salaries).
88. Robert Howlett, a stalwart advocate of interest arbitration, expressed the issue
well: "It is urged that legislated arbitration damages collective bargaining. If true, the
postulate leads nowhere. If the public interest is better served by interest arbitration
than by collective bargaining, damage to collective bargaining is immaterial." Howlett,
suDra note 83, at 57.
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Arbitrators are inherently conservative as adjudicators.
Arbitrators are called upon to write the contract for the parties
because the parties' negotiation process has broken down. The
arbitrator's function in these circumstances is to devise a
contract that the parties likely would have reached had the
process not broken down.89  To do this, arbitrators rely
primarily on two factors: what the parties have done in the
past and what other parties have done recently.
Comparability is an important factor that arbitrators rely on,
particularly with respect to wages and other economic issues.90
This is understandable in light of the arbitrator's function. In
deciding what agreement the parties would have reached had
the process not broken down, the most logical proxies are the
agreements reached by other parties in comparable
communities.9' Although comparability is a factor in bargaining
under the threat of a strike, it does not have as predominant an
effect as it does under arbitration. Other factors, such as the
employer's ability to pay, are more likely to have an impact
where the threat of a strike is the impasse resolution device. 92
Arbitrators are strongly inclined against changing the status
quo. They typically award across-the-board percentage pay
increases rather than tinker with existing pay structures.93 A
party seeking to change perceived inequities in existing pay
structures stands very little chance of doing so in arbitration.
89. This is the generally accepted view of the interest arbitrator's role. In an early
interest award, Arbitrator Whitley McCoy forcefully described the role in a manner with
which most parties and arbitrators would agree:
In submitting this case to arbitration, the parties have merely extended their
negotiations-they have left it to this board to determine what they should, by
negotiation, have agreed upon. We take it that the fundamental inquiry, as to
each issue, is: what should the parties themselves, as reasonable men, have
voluntarily agreed to?
Twin Cities Rapid Transit Co., 7 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 845, 848 (1947) (McCoy, Arb.).
90. See Currie & McConnell, supra note 50, at 713-14; Richard W. Laner & Julia
W. Manning, Interest Arbitration: A New Terminal Impasse Resolution Procedure for
Illinois Public Sector Employees, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 839, 856-59 (1984).
91. See FRANK ELKoURi & EDNA A. ELKOUR4 How ARBITRATION WORKS 804-O5 (4th ed.
1985) (describing the "prevailing practice" standard).
92. See Currie & McConnell, supra note 50, at 714; Gregory G. Dell'Omo, Wage
Disputes in Interest Arbitration: Arbitrators Weigh the Criteria, ARB. J., June 1989, at
4, 10; Laner & Manning, supra note 90, at 859-60; Charles J. Morris, The Role of
Interest Arbitration in a Collective Bargaining System, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 427, 471-72
(1976).
93. See Max H. Bazerman, Norms of Distributive Justice in Interest Arbitration, 38
TNDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 558, 569 (1985); Dell'Omo, supra note 92. at 7.
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In noneconomic areas, arbitrators rarely grant unilateral
requests to change matters on which the parties had agreed in
prior contracts.94 This conservatism flows inherently from the
arbitrator's task. The parties' agreements in prior contracts are
a better proxy than the demands of one party for what the
parties would have agreed to had the current round of negotia-
tions not broken down.
In negotiations under the threat of a strike, a party
perceiving a problem with an existing contract term may
demand change, but must assess the importance of the change
to its constituency. If the issue seems very important, the party
can make it a strike issue. If the issue is not as important to
the other side, there may well be a concession. Yet if the other
side also views it as a strike issue, the parties will be forced to
seek compromises that take into account the needs of both
parties' constituencies.
In negotiations under interest arbitration, however, the
importance of the proposed changes to the parties'
constituencies plays a much weaker role in the ultimate result
of the process. The dominant factor is the strength of their
adjudication arguments. Invariably, the proponent of change
will have the weaker argument from the arbitrator's
perspective, and the party resisting change will have little
incentive to compromise. Thus, arbitration stifles creativity
and problem solving in bargaining.9 5 Although arbitration is a
94. See, e.g., Arvid Anderson, Lessons from Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector:
The Ekperience of Four Jurisdictions, in ARBITRATION-1974: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-
SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBrrRATORS 59, 64-65 (Barbara D.
Dennis & Gerald G. Sommers eds., 1974) (noting that interest arbitrators are reticent
to innovate because the parties prefer them to be conservative and predictable); Michael
Finch & Trevor W. Nagel, Collective Bargaining in the Public Schools: Reassessing
Labor Policy in an Era of Reform, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1573, 1648-52 (presenting a study
of all teacher interest arbitration awards in Connecticut which showed that arbitrators
overwhelmingly rejected union proposals for change, granting them only when they
involved traditional union labor relations concerns, such as the use of seniority in
reductions in force and union security provisions); Liebeskind, supra note 83, at 359
(finding that arbitrators in New Jersey "declined to disturb the status quo absent a
demonstrated need"); Thomas Sonneborn, Police and Fire Interest Arbitration in Illinois,
ILL. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL. REP., Spring 1990, at 1, 5 (noting that arbitrators in Illinois
police and firefighter cases generally side with the party proposing to retain existing
contract language).
95. This criticism of interest arbitration is voiced frequently by negotiators. See,
e.g., William H. Clune III & Patrick Hyde, Final Offer Interest Arbitration in Wisconsin:
Legislative History, Participant Attitudes, Future Trends, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 455, 474
(1981); IRRA Meeting Told Mich., Wis., Ill. Dispute Resolution Laws Cut Strikes, 26
Gov't. Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1246, at 39 (Jan. 11, 1988) (reporting on a survey
which found that 28.3% of union negotiators and 13.9% of management negotiators had
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real strike substitute, it is an artificial method of setting terms
and conditions of employment.
To summarize, granting public employees a right to strike
will not distort the democratic process, but will encourage
meaningful collective bargaining. Fact-finding does not provide
a realistic alternative to public employee strikes. Although
interest arbitration does provide a realistic alternative, it is not
desirable because it tends to stifle creativity and problem
solving at the bargaining table.
Recognizing that the right to strike is the better legal policy
for resolving public sector bargaining impasses raises the
question of what the strike right should look like. The
remainder of this Article considers that question.
II. THE LAW OF STRIKES WHERE STRIKES ARE LEGAL
Although it may be trite to speak of the states as laboratories
experimenting with different approaches to problems, that
characterization aptly applies to public sector impasse resolu-
tion. Not only are the states divided over which impasse
resolution device (strike, fact-finding, or interest arbitration)
should be provided, but they also display considerable diversity
of approach to each device. Those states which recognize a
right to strike in public employment vary considerably in how
they implement that right.
Illinois, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania provide a manage-
able sample of the different approaches to legalizing the public
employee strike. These jurisdictions differ with respect to the
type of prestrike impasse resolution procedures that they
mandate. Illinois requires only mediation. Ohio and Oregon
mandate prestrike fact-finding, while Pennsylvania, until a
recent amendment governing teacher strikes, gave its labor
board discretion to require prestrike fact-finding.
The laws of these jurisdictions also differ with respect to the
standards that courts must employ when deciding whether to
enjoin a lawful strike. Illinois and Ohio limit the issuance of
injunctions to strikes that pose a clear and present danger to
dropped innovative demands during bargaining in Wisconsin to improve their chances
if negotiations proceeded to arbitration); id. at 40 (quoting management negotiator Don
O'Brien's view that interest arbitration chills innovation in bargaining).
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public health and safety. Oregon and Pennsylvania provide for
the enjoining of strikes which pose a clear and present danger
to the public welfare.
A. The Right to Strike in Illinois
In Illinois, two statutes, administered by three agencies,
regulate collective bargaining in the public sector. The Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA),96 administered by the
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB), governs
collective bargaining in public education. The Illinois Public
Labor Relations Act (IPLRA)" administered by the Illinois
State and Local Labor Relations Boards (ISLRB and ILLRB),
governs the remainder of the public sector.
In public education, parties who have not reached an
agreement ninety days before the scheduled start of the school
year must so notify the labor board. Within forty-five days of
the scheduled start of the school year, the board may, upon
request by one party or on its own motion, invoke mediation if,
after a reasonable period of negotiation, the parties have
reached impasse. The board must invoke mediation if the
parties have not reached an agreement fifteen days before the
scheduled start of the school year.9"
The IELRB's rules place a significant administrative gloss on
the statutory language. The rules provide for the board to
invoke mediation beginning forty-five days before the scheduled
start of the school year upon findings that the parties have not
reached an agreement and that mediation would assist the
parties.99 The rules do not reiterate the statutory requirement
of "impasse;" they recognize the confusing nature of the
statute's use of that term. Traditionally, impasse refers to the
point at which the parties, despite the best of faith, are so
deadlocked that further negotiations under existing conditions
would be futile.'00 At that point, the parties legally are entitled
to act unilaterally with regard to mandatory subjects of
96. 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, §§ 1-21 (1992).
97. 5 ILL. CoMP. STAT. act 315, §§ 1-27 (1992).
98. Id. § 12.
99. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 80, § 130.30(e) (1992).
100. See Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967).
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bargaining.10 ' When the requirement of impasse for invoking
mediation is read in the context of the entire statute, it is clear
that the invocation of mediation is designed to further the
negotiation process and does not declare the futility of that
process. 102
The rules also permit the parties to defer selection of the
mediator after the labor board's automatic invocation of
mediation fifteen days before the scheduled start of the school
year. To do so, the parties jointly must stipulate that they will
not resort to economic weapons for at least ten days after a
mediator is selected. At any time, either party may withdraw
the stipulation and trigger the mediator-selection process.
1 3
The stipulated deferral of mediator selection was an adminis-
trative response to concerns voiced by both labor and manage-
ment that mandating formal mediation fifteen days before the
start of the school year would be counterproductive if the
parties were making adequate progress on their own and the
bargaining was not ripe for mediation. 10 4 Subsequently, the
legislature amended the IELRA to authorize the rule
expressly.15
The law governing impasse resolution outside of education
differs in several significant respects. First, certain employ-
ees-specifically, security employees (primarily prison guards),
peace officers, firefighters, and fire department paramedics are
denied the right to strike, but are granted the right to interest
arbitration.0 6 Second, partiesgranted the right to strike do not
have bargaining notice timetables or provisions for labor board
invocation of mediation.
There are five general requirements for a lawful strike
throughout the public sector in illinois: (1) the employees must
be represented by an exclusive bargaining representative; (2)
the existing collective bargaining agreement, if any, must have
expired; (3) the parties must not have agreed to use interest
arbitration; (4) there must have been prior resort to mediation;
101. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
102. See Malin, supra note 29, at 124 n.99; cf. City of Fostoria, 3 Ohio Pub.
Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1 3058, at VII-119 (Ohio St. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1986)
(prohibiting unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment before reaching
the "ultimate impasse").
103. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 80, § 1130.30(b)(2) (1992).
104. See Malin, supra note 29, at 125-26.
105. An Act in Relation to Labor, Pub. Act 86-412, 1989 Ill. Laws 2552 (codified as
amended at 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, § 12 (1992)).
106. 5 ILL. CoMP. STAT. act 315, § 14 (1992). Paramedics not employed by a fire
department do have the right to strike, however. County of Jackson, 5 Ill. Pub.
Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 2037, at X-271 (Ill. St. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1989).
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and (5) the union must have given at least five days' notice of
its intent to strike.
10 7
The IELRA is silent concerning the consequences of an illegal
strike. The IPLRA, however, expressly provides that an
employer may discipline an employee who engages in an illegal
strike.'08  The IPLRA does not state whether this is the only
remedy available to the employer.
On their faces, both statutes therefore leave the parties to act
at their peril when deciding whether to strike or how to
respond to a strike. To illustrate this, consider the following
hypothetical: The union has given notice of its intent to strike
before any mediation sessions were held. The union also has
set a strike deadline for Monday. After the union gives notice,
a mediation session is held at which some progress is made.
The parties nevertheless remain far apart, and the union asks
for a Saturday meeting. The employer is willing, but the
mediator is not available until Tuesday. The union proposes
meeting on Saturday without the mediator, and the employer
asks that the union put off the strike deadline until after the
mediation session on Tuesday.
In Illinois, both parties in the hypothetical must deal with a
considerable degree of legal uncertainty. If the union strikes on
Tuesday, it faces claims that the strike is illegal both because
the union did not engage in sufficient prestrike mediation and
because it gave its strike notice before any mediation.'0 9 If the
107. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 315, § 17(a) (1992); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, § 13 (1992).
There are subtle differences between the requirements in public education and the
general public sector. First, in public education, the contract must have expired
absolutely. Id. § 13(d). This reflects a statutory requirement that every contract in
public education contain no-strike and binding grievance arbitration provisions. Id.
§ 10(c). In the general public sector, the parties have the option to agree not to have
no-strike and binding arbitration provisions in their contracts. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. act
315, § 8. Where they do so, the union need not await the contract's expiration before
striking. Id. § 17(a)(2).
Second, in public education, the statute requires that "mediation has been used
without success," 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, § 13(b), whereas in the general public
sector, the requirement is that "mediation has been used," 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 315,
§ 17(a)(4). Third, the IELRA requires the union to serve its strike notice on the
employer, the labor board, and, where relevant, the regional school superintendent. 115
ILL. COMIP. STAT. act 5, § 13(c). The IPLRA requires only that the notice be served on the
employer, id. § 17(a)(5), but ISLRB and ILLRB rules require that a copy be filed with
the appropriate labor board. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 80, § 1230.180(e) (1992).
108. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 315, § 17(b) (1992).
109. See Chicago Board ofEduc., 3 111. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1 1111,
at VII-349 (Ill. Educ. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1987) (raising, but not deciding, the issue of the
sequence of strike notice and mediation).
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strike is improper, it is not protected and the employer may
discipline or discharge the strikers." The employer might also
have remedies against the union.
The employer also faces numerous questions. May it lawfully
refuse to meet on Saturday without the mediator? If the union
strikes, should the employer discipline or discharge the
strikers? If the employer does so, and the labor board later
holds that the strike was protected, the employer will be liable
for unfair labor practices."'
Suppose the employer decides that self-help is too risky.
Where does the employer go for relief? The employer might
seek an injunction. Prior to the enactment of the statutes, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the state's anti-injunction act
did not bar a court from enjoining a public sector strike."2 The
continuing validity of this ruling in light of the statutes is
debatable, however. Moreover, an action for an injunction
might be preempted by the labor boards' primary jurisdiction." 3
Recognizing the doubts surrounding an injunction petition,
the employer might file unfair labor practice charges. The
statutes, however, do not make an improper strike an unfair
labor practice expressly. It could be argued, by analogy to the
law governing the private sector, that the strike, even if
unprotected, is not an unfair labor practice." 4
When left to their peril, it appears that the parties usually
concentrate on negotiating rather than litigating. Indeed, there
has been very little litigation in Illinois over the legality of
strikes. It was not until 1992 that the IELRB held that an
illegal strike was an unfair labor practice." 5 In Joliet Junior
College, the board held that a union's strike without first
serving a five-day notice on the regional school superintendent
constituted a refusal to bargain in good faith, in violation of
section 14(b)(3) of the IELRA." 6 The board also held that the
110. See NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939); Chrysler Corp., 232 N.L.R.B.
466 (1977), affd, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3063 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
111. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
112. City of Pana v. Crowe, 316 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Ill. 1974).
113. See Malin, supra note 29, at 133-43.
114. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (holding that
the NLRB had exceeded its powers when it determined that a union, in sponsoring
conduct designed to interfere with the employer's business during contract negotiations,
was engaging in unfair labor practices).
115. See Board of Trustees of Joliet Junior College, Community College Dist. No.
525, 8 Ill. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1 1011, at IX-39 (Ill. Educ. Lab. Rel. Bd.
1992).
116. Id. at IX-42.
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illegal strike irreparably harmed the employer by skewing the
bargaining process and directed its general counsel to seek a
preliminary injunction in state court.11 The board cautioned,
however, that parties should not assume that every illegal
strike will automatically bring a board directive for preliminary
injunctive relief."8
Joliet Junior College still leaves many parties to act at their
peril. The decision applies only to the IELRA, and it is at least
arguable that the IPLRA, by expressly sanctioning employer
self-help for- illegal strikes, has precluded unfair labor practice
resolution of disputes regarding a strike's legality.
Furthermore, many issues regarding job actions remain
unresolved under both acts. For example, may a union engage
in a concerted refusal to perform voluntary work (such as
overtime, or, for teachers, supervision of extracurricular
activities) to pressure an employer at the bargaining table, or
are such actions subject to the statutes' strike requirements?".9
There also have been no rulings even suggesting how a party
should know if it has made sufficient use of mediation to enable
it to strike lawfully.
20
The Illinois public sector bargaining laws also regulate the
use of economic weapons by employers. The statutes appear to
117. Id. at IX-43.
118. Id. at IX-42.
119. In Zion Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6,6 Ill. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press)
1021, at IX-102 (Ill. Educ. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1990), the IELRB reversed its executive
director's dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge that the union had engaged in a
concerted refusal to perform extracurricular work without complying with the statute's
strike requirements. Id. at IX-103. The board held that a complaint should issue
because the charge raised an issue of law whether such a concerted refusal to perform
voluntary work amounted to a strike. Id. The board did not indicate, however, how it
might ultimately rule on the legal issue.
120. There is considerable controversy over the meaning of the IELRA's requirement
that mediation be used "without success." Legislative history shows an intent to rely
on mediation to prevent and shorten strikes. See Main, supra note 29, at 127 n.106
(citing and discussing Illinois legislative history). It is clear that the statute does not
require a mediator to give up before the union can strike.
In Chicago Bd. of Educ., 3 Ill. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1 1111, at VII-
349 (Ill. Educ. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1987), the IELRB reversed its executive director's dismissal
of an unfair labor practice charge that the union had violated the IELRA by issuing a
notice of its intent to strike before engaging in mediation. The board held, however,
only that the complaint raised a sufficiently tenable legal issue to warrant a hearing.
Id. at VII-350. It also found that the employer's position did not have a sufficient
probability of success on the merits and denied the employer's petition to seek a
preliminary injunction. Id. The parties settled the complaint when they settled the
strike. Telephone Interview with David Youngerman, Chief Hearing Officer, Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Board (Mar. 25, 1993).
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allow employers to lockout employees.' 2 ' The IELRB has
analogized to private sector precedent and has held that, in
responding to strikes, employer tactics that are inherently
destructive of employee rights to engage in concerted activity
are per se discriminatory and hence illegal, whereas employer
tactics that are comparatively slight in discriminatory effect are
presumed illegal, but will be considered lawful if the employer
can show a legitimate justification for them.
122
Once a lawful strike is underway, the Illinois statutes make
obtaining an injunction very difficult. Education employers
may petition a circuit court to enjoin a strike that poses a clear
and present danger to the public health and safety, but an
unfair labor practice by the employer or other evidence of "a
lack of clean hands" is a defense to the injunction.'23 Outside
of public education, injunctions are available against strikes
that pose a clear and present danger to the public health and
safety, but not through immediate employer court action.
Instead, employers must petition the labor board for a strike
investigation, which the board must complete within seventy-
two hours. The employer may sue for an injunction only if the
labor board finds that a clear and present danger exists.
Moreover, if an injunction issues, the parties are subject to the
interest arbitration provisions which govern peace officers and
firefighters.
124
The ISLRB has interpreted the clear and present danger
standard narrowly. It has authorized injunctions against a
121. Section 14(m) of the IPLRA, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 315, § 14(m) (1992), prohibits
police officers and firefighters from striking and employers from locking them out,
thereby impliedly recognizing that employers may lockout other employees.
122. Carmi Community Unit Sch. Dist. 5,6 111. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press)
1020, at IX-93 (Ill. Educ. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1990) (relying on NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) and NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963)).
In Carmi, the IELRB held that the employer illegally discriminated against strikers
when it closed its schools to students, but kept them open to nonstriking teachers,
paying those teachers their regular per diem salaries while having them work shorter
hours than the normal school day. Id. at IX-98 to IX-99. The board reasoned that the
employer's actions conferred a benefit, i.e., regular pay for fewer hours, on nonstrikers
that was not available to strikers and thereby discriminated against strikers without
justification. Id. In Minonk-Dana-Rutland Community, Unit Sch. Dist., 6 Ill. Pub.
Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1032, at IX-130 (Ill. Educ. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1990), the
board's executive director interpreted Carmi to allow an employer to close schools to
students, keep those schools open to nonstriking teachers, and pay the nonstrikers their
regular per diem wages, as long as the nonstrikers were required to work their regular
hours.
123. 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, § 13 (1992).
124. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 315, § 18 (1992).
WINTER 1993]
342 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:2
strike by water treatment workers which would have resulted
in the deterioration of a city's water quality below acceptable
levels125 and a strike by employees of a municipal electric
company which would have blacked out a city.126 In both cases,
the board limited the injunction authorization to a few
employees whose presence on the job was essential to
maintaining the services. 12 7  All other members of the
bargaining unit remained free to strike.
121
Thus, the Illinois statutes rely primarily on the threat and
use of economic weapons to settle bargaining impasses. The
statutes minimize labor board and court intervention and place
maximum control in the hands of the parties. Although both
statutes require prestrike mediation, the parties control the
timing of mediation and whether they will use any other third-
party assistance. The parties also control the decision whether
to challenge the legality of the use of economic weapons.
129
Considerable legal uncertainty concerning the meaning of
statutory language encourages the parties to resolve differences
about legal questions at the bargaining table rather than in
labor board litigation. Furthermore, the requirement of a clear
and present danger to public health and safety makes enjoining
a strike in public education virtually impossible. 30 Outside of
the education sector, employers seeking strike injunctions first
must obtain authorization from the labor board and then
convince a court that the back-to-work order is proper. If the
employer succeeds, it likely will obtain an order limited to an
essential skeleton crew, and the order will come at the cost of
being forced into interest arbitration.
125. City of Edwardsville, 1 Ill. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 2015, at
VIII-87 (Ill. St. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1985).
126. City of Naperville, 7 111. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1 2033, at X-154
(Ill. St. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1991).
127. See Naperville, 7 Ill. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) at X-155;
Edwardsville, 1 Ill. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) at VIII-88.
128. See Naperville, 7 Ill. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) at X-155;
Edwardsville, 1 Ill. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) at VIII-88.
129. See Elgin Teachers Ass'n, 7 Ill. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1 1115,
at IX-465 (Ill. Educ. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1991) (holding that parents and taxpayers lack
standing to file unfair labor practice charges challenging the legality of a strike).
130. See Malin, supra note 29, at 131-33. Even a strike by support staff which
might render the buildings unsafe, such as a strike by boiler operators during the
winter, should not be enjoined, because the employer can avoid the danger by closing
the schools.
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B. The Right to Strike in Ohio
The Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act
(OPECBA)131 also grants public employees the right to strike,
but differs from the Illinois statutes in many significant ways.
First, it denies the right to strike to a broader class of employ-
ees: police, firefighters, deputy sheriffs, state highway patrol
officers, dispatchers of police and firefighters, emergency
medical and rescue units, nurses, employees of the state schools
for the blind and deaf, public retirement system employees,
correctional employees, penal and mental institution guards,
psychiatric attendants, and youth leaders at correctional
facilities, but gives them a right to interest arbitration.
132
The Ohio statute imposes a statutory time frame on the
parties' negotiations regardless of whether the employees have
the right to strike. Fifty days before the expiration of a
collective-bargaining agreement, either party may petition the
Ohio State Employment Relations Board (OSERB) to inter-
vene. 133 Forty-five days prior to contract expiration, the OSERB
must appoint a mediator.134 Thirty-one days prior to contract
expiration, the labor board must appoint up to three fact
finders.'35 The fact finders must make their findings of fact and
recommendations within fourteen days of appointment unless
the parties agree to extend the time. 36 The parties then have
seven days to reject the recommendations by a three-fifths vote
of the union's membership or the employer's legislature.
37
The union's rejection must be by three-fifths of all its
members in the bargaining unit; three-fifths of those voting will
not suffice. 138 Moreover, to constitute a valid rejection, the vote
must comply with OSERB rules.33 These rules require a secret
ballot election, with the ballots to be tallied upon the conclusion
131. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.23 (Anderson 1991).
132. Id. § 4117.14(D)(1).
133. Id. § 4117.14(C)(2).
134. Id.
135. Id. § 4117.14(C)(3).
136. Id. § 4117.14(C)(5).
137. Id. § 4117.14(C)(6).
138. Miami Univ., 3 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 3051, at VII-102
(Ohio St. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1986).
139. Id.
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of the election. 140  A union or employer who rejects the fact-
finding recommendations must serve written notice of the vote
on the other party and on the OSERB. Failure to serve timely
notice is fatal to the rejection.
141
The OSERB must publicize the fact-finding report within
seven days, 142 which it does by posting a notice in its main
office and mailing a copy of the report to the press.143 The
union may strike seven days after the OSERB publishes the
fact-finding recommendations, or earlier if the contract has
expired,' 44 provided it has given the employer and the board ten
days' prior written notice of its intent to strike. 145 OSERB rules
require that the notice specify the date on which the strike will
occur.'46 The OSERB, by decision, has held that the notice may
not recite simply the statutory definition of "strike," but instead
must specify the type of strike action that the union
contemplates. 47 The notice is timely as of the date it is mailed;
delays in the mail do not invalidate it.
48
The OPECBA expressly authorizes the parties to opt out of
the statutory provisions by adopting a mutually agreed upon
dispute settlement procedure (MAD). The statute authorizes:
(1) conventional arbitration, (2) final offer, package arbitration,
(3) final offer, issue-by-issue arbitration, or (4) final-offer-plus-
fact-finder-recommendation arbitration, in addition to
settlement by a citizens' conciliatory council and "[a]ny other
140. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-9-05(M) (1987). The rules do not define "secret
ballot." It remains to be seen how closely the OSERB will police the elections. Cf.
MARTIN H. MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WrTHIN THE UNION 249-51 (1988) (discussing secret
balloting under the Labor-Management Recording and Disclosure Act).
141. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-9-05(M)-(N) (1987). When the last day of the
rejection period falls on a weekend, notice is timely if mailed on the following Monday.
Carlisle Local Bd. of Educ., 5 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1 5019, at X-16
(Ohio St. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1987).
142. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(6) (Anderson 1991).
143. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-9-05(P) (1987).
144. Ohio Council 8 v. Springfield Bd. of Parks Trustees, 539 N.E.2d 175, 179 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1988).
145. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (Anderson 1991).
146. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-13-01(B)(1) (1987); accord South Euclid-Lyndhurst
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 1 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1 1205, at
VII-157, VII-158 (Ohio St. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1984).
147. Fort Frye Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 5 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel.
Press) 1 5015, at X-11, X-12 (Ohio St. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1987). The OSERB did not apply
its holding in the actual case, raising interesting questions of administrative law
concerning whether it engaged in rulemaking or adjudication. See generally NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 770-75 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
148. Summit County Dep't of Human Servs., 2 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel.
Press) 1 2334, at VII-188, VII-189 (Ohio St. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1985).
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dispute settlement procedure mutually agreed to by the
parties."149 The Ohio act thus affords the parties the flexibility
to design their own prestrike procedures to meet their needs
more effectively.
OSERB rules and rulings, however, may have the effect of
inhibiting party flexibility. The rules provide that any variation
in the statutory timelines for mediation and fact-finding, except
for extensions of time after appointment of the fact-finding
panel, will be considered a MAD. 150 Thus, the board will not
pay one-half of the cost of the fact-finding panel, which it pays
under the statutory procedure. 15' Furthermore, the OSERB has
held that a MAD will not be sustained if it is contrary to a
compelling public policy.'52 This led to an ironic result in Mad
River-Green Local Board of Education.'53 The parties had a
two-year contract with a wage reopener for the second year.
The contract provided that either party could declare impasse
which would trigger a joint request for mediation. It further
provided that mediation would continue until agreement or
until the contract expired. 1"
Upon the union's demand, the parties negotiated pursuant to
the reopener. 155 They entered mediation and subsequently the
union struck. The OSERB had held previously that a union
may strike in the middle of a contract term where there is a
wage reopener. 156 The OSERB held that the Mad River-Green
MAD was invalid because it provided for mediation to continue
interminably and, therefore, never allowed the union to
strike.'57 The OSERB asserted that "there is no practical way
to interpret the MAD provision to allow for the exercise of this
right [to strike]; since if no settlement is reached, the
parties ... are supposed to continue mediation until the
149. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(1) (Anderson 1991).
150. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-9-03(F) (1987).
151. Id. § 4117-9-03(E).
152. Mad River-Green Local Bd. of Educ., 5 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel.
Press) 1 5695, at X-540 (Ohio St. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1988) (finding a MAD to be faulty
because it precluded the right to strike during the reopener period); Vandalia-Butler
City Sch. Dist., 3 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 3019, at VII-36 (Ohio St.
Empl. Rel. Bd. 1986) (upholding a MAD because it established an alternate procedure
for strike-permissive public employees).
153. 5 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1 5695.
154. Id. at X-540.
155. Id. at X-540 to -541.
156. Carlisle Local Bd. of Educ., 5 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press)
5019, at X-16 (Ohio St. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1987).
157. Mad River-Green, 5 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) at X-541.
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expiration of the Agreement." l" s The board never explained
why mediation and a strike could not occur simultaneously.
Consequently, the union was required to exhaust the statutory
procedures before it could strike.
Thus, parties seeking flexibility in their bargaining
procedures sacrifice the state's contribution to the costs of fact-
finding and run the risks both that the OSERB will invalidate
their MAD and that any strike undertaken pursuant to the
MAD may be declared illegal. This latter risk appears to be
substantial. Although the OSERB has upheld MADs which
bypassed mediation,'59 it has invalidated a MAD which
bypassed the strike notice 6 ' and one which set a fifteen-day
deadline for fact finder recommendations, but failed to specify
what would happen if the fact finder failed to meet the deadline
and the parties did not agree to an extension.16' The OSERB's
ruling in Mad River-Green raises such questions as whether a
MAD which liberalizes the strike notice or which bypasses
employer or union votes on prestrike proposals or
recommendations will survive board review.
62
Unlike the law in Illinois, the Ohio act expressly addresses
the consequences of an illegal strike. An employer who believes
that the union has not complied with the statutory
requirements may petition the OSERB to determine whether
the strike is unauthorized. The board must make a
determination within seventy-two hours. If it finds the strike
to be unauthorized, the employer may give the striking
employees twenty-four hours' notice and then remove or
suspend those who continue to strike. Unauthorized strikers
who are not dismissed permanently are prohibited from
receiving pay raises for one year and are docked two days' pay
for each day that they strike.
163
The Ohio act authorizes injunction petitions in the court of
common pleas against strikes by employees who do not have
the right to strike or by strike-eligible employees prior to the
158. Id.
159. Niles City Bd. of Educ., 8 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1 1976,
at X-787 (Ohio St. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1991); Vandalia-Butler City Sch. Dist., 3 Ohio Pub.
Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 3019, at VII-35 (Ohio St. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1986).
160. Central Ohio Transit Auth., 1984-86 Ohio St. Empl. Rel. Bd. 345 (1986).
161. Weathersfield Local Bd. ofEduc., 8 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press)
1 1775, at X-666 (Ohio St. Emp. Rel. Bd. 1991).
162. See Jack G. Day, Report From Serbia, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 353, 360-61
(1985) (raising similar questions).
163. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.23 (Anderson 1991).
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exhaustion of the dispute settlement procedures. Unfair labor
practices by the employer are not defenses to the injunction
action. 16
Thus, in contrast to Illinois, a union risks very little by
striking in Ohio with the propriety of such action in doubt. The
primary risk is that the employer will sue for an injunction or
will petition the OSERB to determine whether the strike is
unauthorized. An employer also risks little because it can force
an OSERB ruling within seventy-two hours. The employees
risk nothing. Before they can be disciplined or discharged, the
OSERB must find their strike to be unauthorized and their
employer must give them a day's notice of the OSERB ruling
and an opportunity to return to work.
The Ohio statute prohibits the employer from locking out or
"otherwise prevent[ing] employees from performing their
regularly assigned duties where an object thereof is to bring
pressure on the employees or an employee organization to
compromise or capitulate to the employer's terms regarding a
labor relations dispute." 16 At least one management attorney
has cautioned that this statutory language may prohibit
employers from hiring permanent replacements and from
subcontracting struck work.
166
Lawful strikes which pose a clear and present danger to the
public health and safety are restrainable for seventy-two hours
by employer petition in the court of common pleas. During this
period, the OSERB must determine whether a clear and present
danger exists. If the board so finds, the court may enjoin the
strike for up to sixty days. During that period, the parties
must resort to mediation, with the mediator determining
whether the sessions will be public. Forty-five days into the
process, the mediator may issue a public report on the status of
negotiations.'
67
Like Illinois, Ohio has interpreted the clear and present
danger standard narrowly. In Central Ohio Transit
Authority,6 ' the OSERB refused to find that a strike by
employees of the Central Ohio Transit Authority (COTA) posed
a clear and present danger to public health and safety. The
164. Id. § 4117.15.
165. Id. § 4117.11(A)(7).
166. Robert J. Townsend, Some Aspects of Ohio Public Sector Collective Bargaining
from an Employer's Point of View, in FIRST ANNUAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
INSTITUTE 45-46 (William F. Dolson ed., 1985); cf. Charles E. Wilson, The Replacement
of Lawful Economic Strikers in the Public Sector in Ohio, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 639 (1985).
167. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.16 (Anderson 1991).
168. 4 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1 4040, at VII-58 (Ohio St. Empl.
Rel. Bd. 1987).
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board defined the injunction standard as "a powerful life, body
or property threatening condition both obvious and imminent"
that is "more than random individual hardship and more than
mere inconvenience." 169 The board held that COTA's reliance
on evidence of individual hardships and inconvenience in
securing transportation to work, to medical facilities, to
groceries, and to drug stores was not sufficient to enjoin the
strike. 7 ' It faulted COTA for not showing that alternative
transportation would be unavailable and for not introducing
any studies of the strike's systematic impact.'
7 1
In general, Ohio's approach to public sector impasse
resolution differs considerably from Illinois' approach. Ohio
places such substantial restraints on the parties' use of
economic weapons that it does not rely on the fear of economic
warfare as the primary method of settling bargaining impasses.
Rather, it relies primarily on fact-finding and on public
pressure to bring the parties to an agreement. The extent of
the reliance on fact-finding is evident from the requirement of
fact-finding and the specific procedural detail required to reject
fact-finder recommendations. A minor procedural error results
in the recommendations being deemed accepted. The extent of
the reliance on publicity is evident from the requirement that
the OSERB publicize the fact finder's recommendations, and
from the authorization of public mediation sessions and public
mediator reports following the enjoining of strikes which
endanger public health and safety. This contrasts markedly
with the Illinois labor boards' rules, which provide for private
negotiations and mandate mediator confidentiality.1
72
C. The Right to Strike in Oregon
The Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act
(OrPECBA)173 prohibits police officers, firefighters, prison and
mental health institution guards, and 9-1-1 operators from
169. Id. at VII-60.
170. Id.
171. Id. at VII-60 to -61.
172. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 80, § 1130.30(g)-(h) (1992).
173. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 243.650-.782 (1991).
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striking,174 but provides them with a right to petition for
interest arbitration. 75  The Oregon courts and the Oregon
Employment Relations Board (OERB) interpret these categories
narrowly to encompass only those employees whose job duties
are such that it can be said without a case-by-case
determination that a strike would threaten the public. 176 Thus,
prison employees such as teachers, stewards, nurses, and
skilled craft workers have the right to strike because
maintaining prison security is not their primary
responsibility. 177 Similarly, parole officers have the right to
strike, 178 as do civilian employees of a police department, such
as dispatchers, parking and animal control workers, and clerical
workers. 79
In bargaining units that have the right to strike, either party
may request mediation "after a reasonable period of
negotiation." 8 0 The mediation request must state the issues in
dispute and the number and length of the bargaining sessions
that have been held.' The number and length of meetings
necessary to comprise a reasonable period of negotiation
depends upon the number and complexity of the issues
raised.8 2 Premature requests for mediation, however, do not
constitute per se bad-faith bargaining.8 3  A party may raise
174. Id. § 243.736.
175. Id. § 243.742(2). The OERB may initiate such arbitration on its own motion
if deemed appropriate and in the public interest. Id.
176. See AFSCME Local 2623-A v. State, 628 P.2d 1228, 1239-41 (Or. Ct. App.
1981).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1243-44.
179. See City of Canby v. Canby Police Ass'n, 680 P.2d 1033, 1034-35 (Or. Ct. App.
1984) (dispatchers); City of McMinnville, 7 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining
Rep. 5924 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1983) (parking enforcement officers, animal control
officers, and clerks); Forest Grove Police Dep't, 6 Or. Pub. Employee Collective
Bargaining Rep. 5363, 5369 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1982) (dispatchers and parking
enforcement officers).
180. OR. REV. STAT. § 243.712(1) (1991). The parties need not be at impasse to
proceed to mediation. Oregon City Sch. Dist. No. 62, 5 Or. Pub. Employee Collective
Bargaining Rep. 4246 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1981).
181. OR. ADMIN. R. 115-40-000 (1993).
182. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 509J, 12 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining Rep.
781, 786-87 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1991) (finding that two brief meetings during which the
union did not have an opportunity to explain the reasons behind its extensive proposals
did not constitute a reasonable period of negotiation).
183. Id. at 785-86.
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permissive subjects of bargaining' s4 in mediation, provided
that it does not condition agreement on the permissive
subjects.
18 5
Beginning fifteen days after the commencement of mediation,
either party may request fact-finding.' Seven days prior to
the fact-finding hearing, each party must submit a list of issues
in dispute.' If one party has objected properly to an issue
because it is a permissive subject of bargaining, the other party
may not pursue the issue in fact-finding.' Usually, a party
may not improve the position it submits to the fact finder over
the offer it made to the other party. The Oregon board regards
such improvements on significant issues as strong evidence of
bad-faith bargaining unless the party can justify the new
position by a change in circumstances that precluded an
opportunity to bargain over the new position.18 9  The fact-
finding hearing is open to the public unless the parties agree
otherwise.' 90 The fact finder must make findings of fact and
recommendations within thirty days following the close of the
hearing. 91
Within five working days following the recommendations,
each party must notify the OERB whether it accepts or rejects
the recommendations. 92 Unlike Ohio, the Oregon statute does
not impose a rejection procedure on the parties. Parties must
accept or reject the fact finder's recommendations as a whole.
A purported partial rejection is a rejection of the entire set of
184. The distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining is
well-established in labor law. Mandatory subjects are matters relating to wages, hours,
and terms and conditions of employment. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). Parties may insist on their positions on mandatory subjects
to the point of impasse and may not act unilaterally until impasse is reached. See
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). All matters that are neither mandatory nor illegal
are permissive subjects of bargaining. Parties may, but are not required to, bargain on
these matters. They may not insist on their positions to the point of impasse and may
act unilaterally on these matters without bargaining. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349-50.
185. Oregon City Sch. Dist. No. 62, 5 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining Rep.
4246, 4255-56 (Or. Emp. Rel. Bd. 1981).
186. OR. REV. STAT. § 243.712(2)(b) (1991).
187. OR. ADMIN. R. 115-40-010(8) (1993).
188. Clackamas County, 9 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining Rep. 9298,9301
(Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1987); Redmond Sch. Dist. 2J, 3 Or. Pub. Employee Collective
Bargaining Rep. 1564, 1570-71 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1977).
189. McKenzie Sch. Dist. No. 68, 8 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining Rep.
8160, 8201 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1985).
190. OR. ADMiN. R. 115-40-010(10) (1993).
191. OR. REV. STAT. § 243.722(3) (1991).
192. Id.
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recommendations.' 9' The Oregon board publicizes rejections of
recommendations.' 94 Parties who unconditionally accept the
fact finder's recommendations are bound by them, even if one
of the parties misunderstood the recommendations. 195 If the
parties are unable to agree on contract language implementing
the recommendations, they must incorporate the fact finder's
language in their agreement. Disputes over the meaning of
that language then become disputes over contract
interpretation, subject to contractual grievance and arbitration
procedures.19
Oregon has four requirements for a lawful strike: (1) the
striking employees must be represented by an exclusive
bargaining representative in a unit in which none of the
employees are prohibited from striking;197 (2) the parties must
have exhausted the mediation and fact-finding procedures; 9 '
(3) a thirty-day cooling off period, running from the date that
the Oregon board publicized the recommendations, must have
expired; 9 9 and (4) the union must have given the board and the
employer "10 days' notice .. .of its intent to strike and [have
stated] the reasons for its intent to strike."20 0
The ten-day strike notice and thirty-day cooling off period
may run concurrently.20 ' Initially, the OERB interpreted the
statute as not requiring that the notice specify the date on
which the strike would begin, reasoning that it should not read
into the act a specificity not expressly contained therein.20 2
193. Oregon City Sch. Dist. No. 62, 5 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining Rep.
4246, 4256 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1981).
194. OR. REv. STAT. § 243.722(3) (1991).
195. Molalla Union High Sch. Dist., 8 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining Rep.
6651 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1984).
196. Cascade Bargaining Council v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. 509J, 732 P.2d
54, 57 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
197. OR. REv. STAT. § 243.726(1) (1991).
198. Id. § 243.726(2)(a).
199. Id. § 243.726(2)(b).
200. Id. § 2 43.726(2)(c). On its face the statue does not require the collective
bargaining agreement to have expired for a strike to be lawful, but does prohibit
refusals to cross other bargaining units' picket lines. Id. § 243.732. Oregon board and
court interpretations prohibit strikes during the term of a contract for the purpose of
changing the contract, but leave open the legality of a mid-term strike to pressure
bargaining over the terms of a successor contract. See Oregon State Employees Ass'n
v. State, 535 P.2d 1385 (Or. Ct. App. 1975).
201. Oregon State Employees Ass'n v. State, 1 Or. Pub. Employee Collective
Bargaining Rep. 324 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd.), affd on other grounds, 535 P.2d 1385 (Or. Ct.
App. 1975).
202. Albany Union High Sch. Dist. 8-J, 2 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining
Rep. 730 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1976).
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Subsequently, the board overruled this position and required
the notice to give a date for the strike, justifying its position by
citing the need for school districts and parents to know before
transporting children to school whether the teachers will be at
school or on strike.2 °3 The strike notices also must specify the
issues in dispute.2°4 A union may not strike over issues that
were not submitted to mediation and fact-finding.2 5
Oregon restricts employer self-help comparably to the way it
restricts the right to strike. An employer may not make
unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment prior
to exhausting mediation and fact-finding.206  Before the
employer may implement a unilateral change, the union must
have rejected the proposed terms, and the employer must give
the union adequate notice, usually five days, of its intent to do
SO.
20 7
Generally, when a party has engaged in improper conduct
during mediation or fact-finding, the OERB will order the
parties to return to that stage of the impasse resolution
process.208 The board, however, has not used this remedy to
impose artificial strike prohibitions. For example, in Redmond
School District 2J, 20 the union had taken permissive subjects
to fact-finding, but its strike notice disavowed those subjects
and only economic issues remained in dispute. The OERB
concluded that it would serve no purpose to return the parties
to fact-finding and held that the strike would be lawful.210
Lawful strikes may be enjoined when they pose a clear and
present danger to the public health, safety, or welfare.211
Employers need not seek a declaration from the OERB before
filing in court. The Oregon act cautions that a clear and
203. Redmond Sch. Dist. 2J (Redmond/), 3 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining
Rep. 1564, 1569 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1977).
204. Id. at 1570.
205. See Roseburg Sch. Dist. No. 4, 8 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining Rep.
7938, 7956 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1985).
206. Wasco County v. AFSCME Local No. 2752, 613 P.2d 1067 (Or. Ct. App. 1980),
aff'g 4 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining Rep. 2397 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1979).
207. Roseburg Sch. Dist. No. 4, 8 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining Rep. at
7957.
208. See Clackamas County, 9 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining Rep. 9298,
9304 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1987); Redmond Sch. Dist. 2J (Redmond I), 3 Or. Pub.
Employee Collective Bargaining Rep. 1611 (Or. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1977).
209. 3 Or. Pub. Employee Collective Bargaining Rep. 1611.
210. Id. at 1615.
211. OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726(3)(a) (1991). There appear to be no reported decisions
interpreting the clear and present danger standard since the statute was enacted in
1973.
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present danger does not include "economic or financial
inconvenience ... that is normally incident to a strike."212 If an
injunction issues, the parties must proceed to interest
arbitration.213
Oregon's right to strike is thus more restrictive than Illinois'
due to Oregon's required exhaustion of fact-finding and required
specification of strike issues. In several respects, however,
Oregon's law is more liberal than Ohio's. Unlike Ohio, Oregon
does not impose any method on the parties for rejecting the fact
finder's recommendations. Deviations from the statutory
procedures do not invalidate a strike where there is no useful
purpose in doing so. Although parties accepting a fact finder's
recommendations may not subsequently renege, Oregon does
not seek to trap the unwary by imposing the recommendations
on a party failing to dot every "i" and cross every "t." On the
contrary, serious noncompliance with the impasse procedures
results in returning the parties to fact-finding or mediation, not
in imposing fact-finder recommendations.
In one respect, Oregon is more restrictive than Ohio. The
waiting period between the publication of the fact-finding
recommendations and a lawful strike is over four times longer
in Oregon.21 4
Because the Oregon statute provides for enjoining strikes that
endanger the public welfare, strike injunctions, at least in
theory, are easier to obtain than in Illinois and Ohio. Injunc-
tions, however, are not without costs to the employer. As in
Illinois, if a strike is enjoined, the parties are forced into
interest arbitration.
D. The Right to Strike in Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act,2 15 also
known as Act 195, grants the right to strike to almost all public
employees except police and firefighters,21 6 who are granted
212. Id. § 243.726(6).
213. Id. § 243.726(3)(c).
214. Compare OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (Anderson 1991) (seven day
waiting period), with OR. REv. STAT. § 243.726(2)(b) (1991) (30 day waiting period).
215. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
216. Id. § 1101.301(2) (excluding, for example, police and firefighters from the
statutory definition of employee).
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interest arbitration by another statute,217 and prison and
mental hospital guards and court personnel, who are granted
interest arbitration by Act 195.218 Prior to July 9, 1992, Act
195's only express requirement for a lawful strike was the
completion of the statutory impasse resolution procedures.219
Unlike Illinois, Ohio, and Oregon, Pennsylvania did not appear
to require a notice of intent to strike.
Act 195 permits mediation if a "dispute or impasse" exists
following "a reasonable period of negotiation."22 ° It further
provides that if no agreement has been reached "twenty-one
days after negotiations have commenced, but in no event later
than one hundred fifty days prior to the 'budget submission
date,' ... both parties shall immediately" request the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation to intervene.22' If the
parties do not reach an agreement twenty days after the start
of mediation "or in no event later than one hundred thirty days
prior to the 'budget submission date,"' the Bureau of Mediation
must so advise the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
(PLRB), which has discretion to invoke fact-finding.222 As a
matter of policy, the PLRB has invoked fact-finding only when
the parties jointly request it or when the mediator indicates
that fact-finding would help to settle the dispute.223
The Pennsylvania board has distinguished between the
prestrike mediation requirement and the duty to bargain in
good faith. Although requesting mediation 150 days prior to
the employer's budget submission date is a prerequisite for a
legal strike, an employer is obligated to proceed to mediation
even though the request comes at a later date.224 Similarly, an
employer may not refuse to bargain when the first bargaining
session would not occur until after the budget submission
date.225
The Pennsylvania board and the courts have interpreted Act
195 to place upon the union the burden to take the initiative to
217. Id. § 217.3.
218. Id. § 1101.1001.
219. Id. § 1101.1003.
220. Id. § 1101.801.
221. Id.
222. Id. § 1101.802.
223. See DAVIS & FISCHER, supra note 23, at 45.
224. City ofWilliamsport, 1 Pa. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 1, 2 (Pa. Lab.
Rel. Bd. 1971).
225. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist., 2 Pa. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 159, 160
(Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1972).
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ensure that mediation is exhausted prior to a strike. If the
employer refuses to join in a request for mediation, the union
must seek it unilaterally.2 6 Even when the union pursues
mediation unilaterally, mediation is not required 150 days
before the budget submission date if the parties have yet to
bargain without third-party assistance.227
Strikes which occur less than twenty days after the parties
first meet with the mediator are illegal regardless of the length
of time which passes between the mediator's appointment and
the first meeting.228 The mandatory mediation period runs
twenty calendar days following the first mediation session,
however, regardless of whether any further mediation sessions
are held during that period.229 If the PLRB fails to invoke fact-
finding within twenty days after mediation began, the union
may assume that the PLRB has decided that fact-finding would
not be helpful and may lawfully strike.30 The board lacks
authority to order fact-finding later than 130 days before the
employer's budget submission date.2"' An employer may not
make unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment
unless the union strikes.232
When the PLRB invokes fact-finding, it appoints the fact
finder or fact-finding panel.233 Within five days following notice
of appointment, the parties must submit written statements of
the issues in dispute and their positions.2 34  Fact-finding
hearings are private.235 Fact-finding recommendations are due
forty days following notification of the board by the Bureau of
Mediation that an agreement has not been reached. 23' Thereaf-
ter, the parties have ten days to advise the PLRB whether they
226. See North Clarion County Sch. Dist., 15 Pa. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel.
Press) 15,208, at 474 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1984).
227. See Centre County Area Vocational Sch., 3 Pa. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel.
Press) 130, 131-32 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1973).
228. Port Auth. v. Division 85, Amalgamated Transit Union, 383 A.2d 954, 961 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1978); United Transp. Union v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 347 A.2d
509, 513 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
229. Peters Township Sch. Dist. v. Peters Township Fed'n of Teachers, 501 A.2d 327,
330-31 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
230. Bellefonte Area Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 304 A.2d 922, 925 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1973).
231. City of Philadelphia v. PLRB, 614 A-2d 213, 214 (Pa. 1992).
232. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. PLRB, 620 A.2d 594, 600 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
233. 34 PA. CODE § 95.54 (1993).
234. Id. § 95.61.
235. Id. § 95.63.
236. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.802(1) (1991 & Supp. 1992).
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accept the recommendations.237 Acceptance must be unequivo-
cal; a conditional acceptance is equivalent to a rejection. 238 If
the parties do not accept the recommendations, the fact finder
publishes them.239 The parties must again advise the PLRB
whether they accept the recommendations not less than five
days nor more than ten days following their publication.240
As in Ohio,241 Pennsylvania does not leave parties to act at
their peril when facing uncertainty concerning the legality of
strike action. Act 195 provides that a public employer should
seek an injunction in the court of common pleas against an
illegal strike24 2 and that employees who violate a strike
injunction may be disciplined or discharged following an
adjudication of contempt.243 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court has interpreted Act 195 to prohibit employers from
engaging in self-help against illegal strikers without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of the strike's legality.2 "
Act 195 provides for injunctions against lawful strikes that
pose a clear and present danger or threat to the public health,
safety, or welfare. 5 Only the public employer has standing to
seek such an injunction.2  Unlike its counterpart in Oregon,
this potentially broad injunction provision has received frequent
use. Prior to July 1992, its primary use was by school districts
contending that teacher strikes endangered the public
welfare.24 7
237. Id. § 1101.802(2).
238. West Shore Sch. Dist., 20 Pa. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 20113,
at 307 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1989).
239. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, § 1101.802(2) (1991 & Supp. 1992).
240. Id. § 1101.802(3).
241. See supra text accompanying note 163.
242. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1002 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
243. Id. § 1101.1005.
244. City of Scranton v. PLRB, 505 A.2d 1360, 1363 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
245. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
246. Alling v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 624, 626 (C.P. 1974).
But see Masloffv. Port Auth., 613 A.2d 1186, 1188 (Pa. 1992) (finding that under the
Pennsylvania Port Authority Act, the Mayor of Pittsburgh has standing to seek an
injunction against a Port Authority transit strike).
247. See, e.g., Wilkes-Barre Area Educ. Ass'n v. Wilkes-Barre Area Sch. Dist., 523
A.2d 1183 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 533 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1987); Bellefonte Area
Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 304 A.2d 922 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973); Armstrong Educ.
Ass'n v. Armstrong Sch. Dist., 291 A.2d 120 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972). But see Masloff,
613 A.2d at 1191 (upholding an injunction against a transit strike); Highland Sewer &
Water Auth. v. Local 459, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 564 (C.P. 1973) (denying an injunction
against a water and sewer treatment employees' strike because supervisors were able
to maintain services).
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Under Act 195, employers may file injunction petitions only
after the strike has begun. Prestrike petitions are premature
and the defect is not cured when the strike begins.248 The
danger must actually be clear and present-fear of a danger
developing in the future does not justify an injunction.249
Harassment of school officials by residents250 and the disruption
of the employer's daily routine251 do not endanger the public
welfare sufficiently to justify an injunction, nor does the loss of
a quality assessment program.252
Most of the controversy over Act 195's injunction standard
focused on whether a strike sufficiently endangered the public
welfare when it lasted so long that it would not be possible to
make up sufficient school days to comply with the state's
requirement of 180 instructional days.253  Under those
circumstances, a school district would lose a proportionate
amount of its state funding.
In Jersey Shore Area School District v. Jersey Shore
Education Association,254 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the loss of state subsidies alone would not warrant a strike
injunction, but the court affirmed the issuance of an injunction
where the subsidy loss was coupled with other detriments to
the public.255 Jersey Shore appeared to approve a pattern of
lower court decisions that enjoined teacher strikes when it
became impossible to meet the 180-day requirement, based on
findings that continuing the strike would lead to a loss of state
aid, the inability of high school seniors to receive counselling for
college aptitude exams and college applications, detrimental
effects on special education students, detrimental effects of
extending the school year on students' ability to find summer
jobs, the denial of hot lunch programs to low income students,
and a loss of earnings by employees outside the struck
248. Commonwealth v. Ryan, 327 A.2d 351, 354-56 (Pa. 1974).
249. Wilkes-Barre Area Educ. Ass'n, 523 A.2d at 1187; Bellefonte Area Educ. Ass'n,
304 A-2d at 924; Armstrong Educ. Ass'n, 291 A-2d at 123-24.
250. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n, 291 A-2d at 124.
251. Wilkes-Barre Area Educ. Ass'n, 523 A-2d at 1186; Armstrong Educ. Ass'n, 291
A-2d at 124.
252. Bellefonte Area Educ. Ass'n, 304 A.2d at 924.
253. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1501 (1992).
254. 548 A.2d 1202 (Pa. 1988).
255. Id. at 1207-08 & n.9.
WINTER 19931 357
358 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:2
bargaining unit.25 6  Thus, a de facto rule appears to have
evolved that a teacher strike may be enjoined once it has gone
on so long as to preclude completing 180 days of pupil
instruction.257
Act 195 is silent concerning the procedures following a strike
injunction. Although courts have the power to order strikers
back to work under the terms of the expired collective bargain-
ing agreement and any tentative agreements reached in
negotiations258 and may order and specify conditions for further
bargaining,259 they lack authority to impose terms not agreed to
by the parties or to order interest arbitration.26 °
Injunctions based on the inability to make up lost school days
would not be available in Illinois and Ohio as a clear and
present danger to the public health and safety. Their
availability in Pennsylvania as a clear and present danger to
the public welfare makes it likely that when parties strike, a
court will intervene before employees suffer a loss of salary and
before employers suffer a loss of revenues and a loss of
instructional service, that is, before the strike really hurts.
261
256. See, e.g., id.; Bethel Park Sch. Dist. v. Bethel Park Fed'n of Teachers, 420 A.2d
18 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980); Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 322 A.2d 767
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974); Butler Area Sch. Dist. v. Butler Educ. Ass'n, 9 Pa. Pub.
Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 9039, at 75 (C.P 1978); Montour Sch. Dist. v.
Montour Educ. Ass'n, 7 Pa. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 322 (C.P. 1976);
School Dist. v. Pittsburgh Fed'n of Teachers, Local 400, 7 Pa. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab.
Rel. Press) 93 (C.P. 1976).
257. This de facto rule was recognized, but opposed, by the dissent in Jersey Shore,
548 A.2d at 1208-10 (Larsen, J., dissenting). In higher education, the Pennsylvania
courts also have enjoined a strike when its continuance would have made it impossible
to make up enough instructional days to complete the semester. Temple Ass'n of Univ.
Professionals v. Temple Univ., 582 A.2d 63,65 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). The controversy
over what constitutes a danger to the public welfare also has erupted in public transit.
In Masloff v. Port Auth., 613 A.2d 1186 (Pa. 1992), the court upheld an injunction
against the Pittsburgh area transit strike, relying on what the dissent characterized as
the "inherent inconveniences" of a transit strike. 613 A.2d at 1193 (Larsen, J.,
dissenting).
258. Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n, 322 A.2d at 767.
259. Armstrong Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n, 595 A-2d 1139, 1142 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991).
260. Bethel Park Sch. Dist., 420 A.2d at 19; Armstrong Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong
Educ. Ass'n, 291 A.2d 125, 128 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972).
261. The importance of make-up days to striking teachers' avoidance of salary loss
is evident from teacher unions' active pursuit of make-up days even against stiff
employer resistance. See, e.g., Upper Bucks County Area Vocational-Technical Sch.
Joint Comm. v. Upper Bucks County Vocational-Technical Sch. Educ. Ass'n, 497 A.2d
943 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985); Upper Merion Area Sch. Dist. v. Upper Merion Educ. Ass'n,
482 A.2d 274 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984); Scanlon v. Mount Union Area Bd. of Sch.
Directors, 415 A.2d 96 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980), affd, 452 A.2d 1016 (Pa. 1982). In Root
v. North Cambria School District, 309 A-2d 175 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), overruled by
Pittenger v. Union Area Sch. Bd., 356 A.2d 886 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976), the parties
agreed to the terms of the new contract after seven days of a strike, but the strike
Right to Strike
Furthermore, the injunction comes at virtually no cost to the
employer in terms of interest arbitration or other postinjunction
proceedings.
On July 9, 1992, Pennsylvania substantially amended its law
governing public school employee strikes.262 The amendments
require mediation forty-five days after negotiations commence,
and in no event later than 126 days prior to the end of the
employer's fiscal year.263 Forty-five days after mediation has
commenced, and not later than eighty-one days before the end
of the fiscal year, fact-finding shall be imposed upon request by
either party. The fact finder or fact-finding panel must make
findings and recommendations within forty days. Within ten
days, the parties must notify the PLRB whether they accept the
recommendations. If they do not accept the recommendations,
they are publicized and within ten days the parties must again
notify the PLRB whether they accept the recommendations.2
Once mediation and fact-finding, if invoked, have been
completed, the union may strike.2" It must give the employer
forty-eight hours' notice of its intent to strike and may not
strike more than twice during a school year.26 6 During the
strike, the employer may not employ a replacement who did not
work for the employer in the preceding twelve months.26 7 If the
strike reaches a point where the employer will be unable to
provide the required 180 days of instruction by June 15 or the
end of the employer's school year, whichever is later, the strike
must cease and the parties must proceed to interest
arbitration.268 If the strike reaches a point where sufficient
days cannot be made up by June 30, the Pennsylvania
Secretary of Education may seek an injunction.269
The interest arbitration must be on a final offer basis in
accordance with one of several alternatives set forth in the
statute. The parties must agree on the format, but if they are
unable to do so, the mediator selects the format. Once the
arbitration award is rendered, either party may reject it within
continued for another 23 days over the issue of make-up days.
262. Act of July 9, 1992, Act No. 1992-88, § 1, 1992 Pa. Legis. Serv. 301, 301-08
(Purdon) (to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1101-A to -1172-A).
263. Id. § 1121-A
264. Id. § 1122-A.
265. Id. § 1131-A
266. Id. § 1101-A.
267. Id. § 1172-A.
268. Id. § 1125-A(b).
269. Id. § 1161-K See Pennsylvania Seeks Injunction To End Penn Hills Teachers
Strike, 31 Gov't Emp. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1504, at 287 (Mar. 1, 1993) (reporting on the
first use of the statute by the Pennsylvania Secretary of Education).
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ten days at a properly convened regular or special meeting. If
a party rejects the award, the strike may resume, but without
the restrictions on who may be hired as a replacement
worker.27
The new Pennsylvania statute substantially restricts the
right to strike and leans toward the Ohio approach of reliance
upon fact-finding. The interest arbitration provisions are
similar to the Ohio fact-finding provisions-the parties are
bound by the third party's decision unless they affirmatively
reject it. Moreover, the new statute guarantees that strikes
will not persist once they begin to really hurt, that is, once
employees begin to lose wages and employers begin to lose state
revenues and have to face voters for failing to meet state
instructional standards.
III. THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE
State legislatures that legalize strikes by public employees do
not intend to encourage work stoppages. Rather, they believe
that once strikes are legal, they can be regulated and
procedures can be required which will reduce the incidence of
strikes and shorten those strikes that do occur.271 This Part
focuses on the experiences in Illinois, Ohio, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania with the lawful right to strike. Part III.A
compares the strike incidence in Illinois and Ohio before and
after legalization of public employee strikes. The analysis does
not firmly establish that legalizing and regulating strikes
decreases their frequency, but does firmly show that
legalization does not result -in increased strike frequency.
Consequently, for the normative reasons set forth in Part I,
public employees should be afforded a lawful right to strike.
Part III.B examines the effects of requiring exhaustion of
nonbinding fact-finding before a lawful strike, finds that such
a requirement lengthens strikes, and concludes that it should
not be imposed.
270. Id. § 1125-A.
271. See Malin, supra note 29, at 101, 127 n.106 (quoting from legislative debates
on the IELRA).
Right to Strike
A. The Effect of Legalizing Public Employee
Strikes in Illinois and Ohio
In 1984, public employees in Illinois and Ohio obtained the
right to strike.272 One could expect that such action would lead
to an increase in public sector strikes in those jurisdictions for
several reasons. First, it seems intuitive that legalizing an
activity that was previously illegal would tend to encourage
that activity. Second, the strike legalization accompanied each
state's first comprehensive public employee collective
bargaining act. Thus, along with the right to strike came
procedures to compel employer recognition of and negotiation
with unions representing their workers. By increasing the
number of units engaged in collective bargaining, such
legislation increased the opportunities for strikes. Third, the
experience in states other than Illinois and Ohio suggests that,
at least initially, increased strike activity may accompany the
legalization of public employee strikes.273 Contrary to this
expectation, however, strike activity actually has declined in
both states since legalization.
Ohio's legislation of public employee strikes took effect on
April 1, 1984. Over the eight years beginning April 1, 1984,
through April 30, 1992, there have been 110 strikes in Ohio.274
Seven of the strikes were unauthorized, presumably because
the union failed to comply with the statutory procedures. In
three of the seven cases, the union apparently corrected its
errors and struck shortly thereafter.275 Table 1 summarizes the
number of strikes by year and type of employer. Table 2 details
the unauthorized strikes followed by lawful strikes.
Table 3 shows the number of strikes by Ohio public
employees from 1974 through 1980. Unfortunately, the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics stopped breaking down strikes by
272. Act of Dec. 27, 1983, Pub. Act 83-1012, 1983 Ill. Laws 6830 (codified at 5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. act 315, §§ 1-27 (1992)); Act of Dec. 27, 1983, Pub. Act 83-1014, 1983 Ill.
Laws 6870 (codified at 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, §§ 1-21 (1992)); Act of July 6, 1983,
Am. Sub. S.B. No. 133, 1983 Ohio Laws 336 (codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§
4117.01-.23 (Anderson 1991)).
273. LESTER, supra note 82, at 60 (reporting that the liberalization of the right to
strike in Minnesota in 1980 led to a flood of strikes in 1981); OLSON ET AL., supra note
8, at 157-59 (noting that Pennsylvania strike activity increased substantially after the
enactment of Act 195).
274. See infra Table 1.
275. See infra Table 2.
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employee function in 1980 and thereafter stopped collecting this
data entirely. The last column of Table 3 shows the number of
strikes excluding law enforcement, corrections, and fire
protection personnel. This column roughly approximates the
employees who would have the right to strike under the Ohio
collective bargaining statute. Comparing these data with those
in Table 1, it is apparent that there have been far fewer strikes
in Ohio since they were legalized.
The Ohio statute seeks to prevent strikes through tightly controlled
procedures. As Professor Clyde Summers observed: "The
antipathy for ... strikes ... is betrayed by the multi-layered
impasse procedures with rigid time tables which make fulfilling
the preconditions for a legal strike extremely difficult."276
Studies and data from the OSERB suggest that many
potential strikes are headed off in the prestrike procedures.
The Ohio data, contained in Table 4, combine strike-eligible and
strike-prohibited employees. The procedures for strike-
prohibited employees are identical to those for strike-eligible
employees except that instead of a strike, these employees may,
after rejection of the fact finder's recommendations, proceed to
interest arbitration, which is called "conciliation" in the statute.
Table 4 shows that most contracts settle during the proceedings
that lead to the terminal step of strike or interest arbitration.
In each year of the statute, except for the first, over seventy-
five percent of the negotiations to which mediators were
appointed advanced to the next step with fact finder appoint-
ments. Thus, settlement with third-party assistance is
occurring primarily at the fact-finding stage. This is not
surprising because the statute allows only fifteen days for
mediation before the OSERB appoints a fact finder.277
Inevitably, the fact finder is forced to mediate.278
Some studies have tried to focus on the success of fact-finding
in resolving bargaining disputes. A study by Professor Calvin
Sharpe of Case Western Reserve University Law School found
that from 1984 to 1986, sixty-two percent of all negotiations in
which the Ohio board appointed fact finders settled before a
hearing. 279  Of the 119 disputes involving strike-eligible
276. Summers, supra note 28, at 274.
277. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(c)(2), (3) (Anderson 1991).
278. See Calvin W. Sharpe & Linda E. Tawil, Fact-Finding in Ohio: Advancing the
Role of Rationality in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 283, 306
(1987).
279. Id. at 299.
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employees that went to fact-finding hearings, twenty-eight
settled before the fact finder's report.80 Another thirty-seven
accepted the fact finder's report and fifty-four rejected it. 2"' Of
the latter, eighty percent of those responding to the survey
indicated that the parties used at least one-fourth of the fact
finder's recommendations in their final settlement.282
Settlements may occur during and after fact-finding in
several ways. The parties may have continued negotiations and
would have reached settlement even if fact-finding had not been
invoked. The pressure of a forthcoming fact-finding hearing
and mediation by the fact finder also may induce settlement.283
The fact-finding hearing itself may clarify the issues and aid in
settlement. The parties may agree to accept the fact finder's
recommendations or they may use them as a basis for further
negotiations leading to settlement. All of these appear to
happen under the Ohio procedures.
Settlements occur in an additional way under the Ohio fact-
finding procedures. Parties may be unwilling to accept the fact
finder's recommendations, but become bound by them because
they do not satisfy the strict procedural requirements for
rejection. This appears to happen with a significant degree of
frequency. For example, one study found that forty-six percent
of fact-finder recommendations which were accepted were
actually "deemed accepted."2  The strict procedural
requirements for rejecting a fact finder's report cause many
reports to be deemed accepted even if the parties are not
satisfied. This may be particularly true for unions. It is more
difficult for a union to mobilize a rejection vote by three-fifths
of its membership than for an employer to mobilize a three-
fifths vote of its legislature. One study reported that employer
rejections outnumbered union rejections by more than two to
one. 28 ' During the same period, two labor educators studied the
fact-finding reports and concluded that unions were not faring
* 280. Id. at 302-03.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 300 n.111.
283. For small and medium-sized bargaining units, the costs of preparing for and
presenting a fact-finding case are significant enough to have an impact on the parties'
bargaining positions. GERHART & DROTNING, supra note 23, at 33.
284. THE REPORT OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNSELING EFFORT TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNOR OF OHio 47 (1986).
285. Id.
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particularly well.286 Indeed, a survey of employers by Professor
Ron Portaro found that they overwhelmingly supported the
three-fifths rule, viewing it as one of the few areas in the
impasse procedures where management had an advantage.3 7
Under the Ohio impasse procedures, there have been far
fewer strikes than occurred prior to the statute. This has been
accomplished through a combination of procedural prodding to
reach an agreement and the imposition of fact-finding
"agreements" by making rejections difficult. The Ohio
experience raises the question: Is such strict control of the
strike weapon necessary to avoid public employee strikes? This
question leads to an examination of the relatively laissez-faire
approach to economic weapons found in Illinois.
Strikes outside of education are almost nonexistent in the
Illinois public sector. They typically occur less than once per
year.28 Table 5 shows the number of strikes in Illinois when
striking was illegal. The last column, which excludes law
enforcement, fire protection, and education personnel, shows
strike experience by noneducational employees who now have
the right to strike in Illinois. Table 5 shows that from 1974
through 1979, this group of employees averaged 9.67 strikes per
year, a considerably higher frequency than has occurred since
strikes were legalized. Table 6 shows the number of strikes in
Illinois public education since they were legalized.
The available pre-Act data are not completely comparable,
but do give some basis for assessing the legalization's impact on
the incidence of strikes in education. Pre-Act data come from
the Illinois State Board of Education and cover only teacher
strikes in elementary and secondary education. The data
exclude nonteaching staff and all higher education strikes.
Table 7 lists this pre-Act exposure.
286. Brenda Cochrane and Debbie Pelley, Fact-Finding in Ohio: How Are Unions
Doing? (Dec. 1987) (unpublished manuscript, presented to the 1987 Midwest-Southern
Regional UCLEA Meeting, Louisville, Kentucky) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
287. Ron M. Portaro, Public-Sector Impasse Legislation: Is It Working?, 12
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 111, 124 (1986) [hereinafter Portaro, Public-Sector Impasse
Legislation] (finding that 75.3% of employers favored the three-fifths requirement); see
also Ron M. Portaro, An Empirical Study of Ohio Impasse Resolution Procedure, 15 J.
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUB. SECTOR 153 (1986).
288. Telephone Interview with Brian Reynolds, Executive Director, Illinois State
Labor Relations Board & Illinois Local Labor Relations Board (Sept. 11, 1992).
Unfortunately, the ISLRB and ILLRB do not keep statistics on specific strikes and
strike durations under the IPLRA. Therefore, a year-by-year breakdown of the few
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TABLE 6
STRIKES IN ILLINOIS UNDER THE IELRA*
Year Notices of Number of Ratio of
Intent to Strikes Notices to
Strike Strikes
1984-85 85 35 2.42:1
1985-86 57 13 4.38:1
1986-87 52 16 3.25:1
1987-88 26 6 4.33:1
1988-89 27 6 4.50:1
1989-90 63 11 5.73:1
1990-91 43 14 3:07:1
1991-92 68 25 2.72:1





ILLINOIS STRIKES BY K-12 TEACHERS*










* Data obtained from Malin, supra note 29, at 123 n.95.
WINTER 1993]
372 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:2
During the first year of the IELRA, 776 K-12 school districts
engaged in teacher bargaining, representing a fifty-three
percent increase over the pre-Act years.28 9 The increase does
not include the nonteaching staff and higher education units.
During the nine years preceding the statute, K-12 teacher
strikes averaged 24.56 per year. The incidence of thirty-five
strikes experienced in 1984-85 is roughly comparable, given the
increase in bargaining. Since the first year of the IELRA,
strike activity has dropped dramatically, hitting a low of six in
the 1987-88 and 1988-89 school years, even though the number
of bargaining units increased substantially.29 °
Thus, the experiences in Ohio and Illinois run counter to the
expectation that enactment of comprehensive public sector
bargaining laws containing a right to strike would increase the
incidence of strikes. Despite an increase in bargaining
activity29' in the first eight years under the Ohio statute,
strikes averaged 13.75 per year,292 compared with an average of
55.71 strikes per year from 1974 to 1980.293 In the first eight
289. ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE
PERIOD OF JANUARY 1, 1984 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1986, at 12 (1987).
290. The ILERB's annual reports show the following:
Year Election Voluntary Decertification[ Certifications Recognition Petitions
Calendar Year 1985 62 17 6
Jan. 1986-June 1986 49 10 8
Fiscal Year 1987 44 10 10
Fiscal Year 1988 65 2 8
Fiscal Year 1989 59 5 7
Fiscal Year 1990 59 14 7
Fiscal Year 1991 50 5 12
The reports do not provide the outcome of the decertification petitions. Nevertheless,
even if we make the unlikely assumption that all of those petitions resulted in the
union's decertification, this would be a net increase of 393 bargaining units since the
1984-85 school year.
291. See PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY AND COUNSELING EFFORT COMMK REPORT TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNOR OF OHIO 10 (1986) (detailing voluntary recognitions and
union certifications pursuant to OSERB elections during the first two years of the Ohio
statute).
292. See supra Table 1 (showing 110 strikes over eight years).
293. See supra Table 3 (showing 390 strikes over seven years).
Right to Strike
years of the Illinois statute, strikes averaged 15.75 throughout
public education,294 despite an increase in bargaining,295
compared to an average of 24.56 strikes per year among K-12
teachers prior to the IELRA.
96
Of course, the enactment of the new legislation was not the
only factor which might have influenced the changes in strike
activity over the years in Ohio and Illinois. Two economic
factors which merit attention are the unemployment rate and
the inflation rate. Studies in the private sector generally agree
that strikes decline as the unemployment rate increases.297
Intuition suggests a similar result in the public sector. As
unemployment increases, employees lower their expectations for
a new collective bargaining agreement. Higher levels of
unemployment also reduce the availability of temporary work
while on strike and increase the availability of striker
replacements. Studies in the public sector, however, have
reached inconsistent results regarding the relationship between
unemployment rates and strikes, although most find a
relationship similar to that in the private sector.298
As the inflation rate increases, employees' expectations in
collective bargaining probably increase as they try to regain
losses in real wage levels. Therefore, it is not surprising that
studies generally find that the incidence of public sector strikes
is positively correlated with inflation.299
294. See supra Table 6 (showing 126 strikes over eight years).
295. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
296. See supra Table 7 (showing 221 strikes over nine years).
297. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter & George Johnson, Bargaining Theory, Trade
Unions and Industrial Strike Activity, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 35 (1969); Henry S. Farber,
Bargaining Theory, Wage Outcomes, and the Occurrence of Strikes: An Econometric
Analysis, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 262 (1978); Albert Rees, Industrial Conflict and Business
Fluctuations, 60 J. POL. ECON. 371 (1962); Michael Shalev, Trade Unionism and
Economic Analysis: The Case ofIndustrial Conflict, 1 J. LAB. RES. 133 (1980); Andrew
R. Weintraub, Prosperity Versus Strikes: An EmpiricalApproach, 19 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REv. 231 (1966).
298. See, e.g., OLSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 65 (noting that public sector strikes
increased as unemployment increased); William B. Nelson et al., An Economic Analysis
of Public Sector Collective Bargaining and Strike Activity, 2 J. LAB. RES. 77 (1981)
(finding that public sector strikes decrease as unemployment increases); Dane M.
Partridge, A Time Series Analysis of Public Sector Strike Activity, 20 J. COLLECTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS IN PUB. SECTOR 3 (1991) (finding no significant relationship between
unemployment rates and public sector strikes as a whole, but finding that teacher
strikes decrease as unemployment increases); Weintraub & Thornton, supra note 67,
at 197 (finding that teacher strikes decrease as unemployment increases).
299. See, e.g., OLSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 65; Partridge, supra note 299, at 3;
Weintraub & Thornton, supra note 67, at 201.
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Table 8 shows the inflation and unemployment rates and the
number of strikes in the public sector in Ohio and in public
education in Illinois. The table shows that the inflation rate
was generally lower during the last half of the 1980s than in
the prior ten years. This may have contributed to the reduced
number of strikes during the first six years of the statutes. On
the other hand, the unemployment rate also declined during
this period. More often than not, a lower unemployment rate
is associated with an increase in strikes.
To further evaluate the experiences in Ohio and Illinois with
legalizing public employee strikes, we ran single and
multivariate regression analyses of the data in Table 8.300 Each
regression showed a very strong correlation between the change
in the law in Ohio and the decrease in the number of strikes.3 °1
Regression analyses of the experience with strikes in Illinois
public education yielded considerably weaker results. Although
in the single-variate regression, the change in the law was
correlated with a decrease of slightly more than ten strikes per
year and was significant below the .025 confidence level, the
300. I am deeply grateful to my colleague on the Chicago-Kent faculty, Professor
Kevin Smith, for guiding me through the regressions, to our colleague in the IIT
Mathematics Department, Professor Andre Adler, for reviewing the data analysis and
making helpful suggestions for further refinement, and to Carol Johnson for entering
all of the data and running the regressions.
In each case, a dummy variable was used to represent the state of the law, with "0"
indicating that strikes were illegal and "1" indicating that they were legal. We factored
in inflation by lagging the percentage change in the consumer price index by one year.
This was done because we assumed that the increase in the cost of living during the
year before negotiations would represent the degree to which the employees believed
that they had to catch up in salaries. We used the unemployment rate for the year in
which the strikes occurred because we assumed that it would show the degree to which
striker replacements might be available and the degree to which temporary jobs might
be available for strikers.
301. The regressions used the change in the law as the independent variable alone,
and in varying combinations with the inflation and unemployment rates. In all cases,
the model explained over 90% of the change in the number of strikes, the change in the
law was correlated with a decrease of over thirty-five strikes per year, and the
correlation was significant below the .005 confidence interval.
For the single-variate regression, using the change in the law as the only
independent variable, the R-Square value was 0.927 and the adjusted R-Square was
0.918. This indicates that the model explained over 90% of the change in the number
of strikes (the dependent variable). The coefficient was -35.2333, indicating a
correlation between the change in the law and a decrease of 35.2333 strikes per year.
The t value for the change in the law was -10.6622, significant well below the .005
confidence level. That is, we can be more than 99.5% sure that the negative correlation
was not the result of chance. The specific results of the regressions for various
combinations of the change in the law with inflation and unemployment rates
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change in the law explained only between twenty and twenty-
five percent of the change in strike activity. Multivariate
regressions of various combinations of the change in the law
with inflation and unemployment rate independent variables
produced little improvement in the explanatory ability of the
model and showed the change in the law correlated with
decreases in the number of annual strikes ranging from just
under seven to between ten and eleven. All combinations,
except for those limited to the change in the law and the
unemployment rate, showed the change in the Illinois law as
not statistically significant.
0 2
Interpretation of this data requires caution. Although the
Ohio data showed a very strong correlation between passage of
the public sector collective bargaining act and the decrease in
strike activity, data was not available for five years. Although
the Illinois data consistently showed a correlation between the
Illinois statute and a decrease in strike activity, each model
explained a very small portion of the decrease in the number of
strikes, thus suggesting that the independent variables
analyzed here cannot predict strike frequency.
Several caveats apply to the data from both states. First, the
data in both states do not take into account the increase in
bargaining activity that followed the enactment of the statutes.
To this extent, the data underestimate the effects of the
statutes on decreasing strike frequency.
Second, the data do not take into account other factors that
may affect strike frequency. Chief among these omitted factors
is the employer's fiscal climate. Experienced negotiators
generally agree that tight fiscal constraints often lead to more
strikes.0 3 Another factor not captured by the data is the
relative experience of the negotiators.30 4
302. The single-variate regression yielded an R-Square value of 0.251, an adjusted
R-Square of 0.197, a coefficient of-10.1270, and a t value of-.2.1652. The results of the
multivariate regressions are on file with the author.
303. Cf Robert C. Rodgers & Jeffrey D. Straussman, What Factors Contribute to the
Duration of Strikes by Public Employees?, 6 INTL J. PUB. ADMIN. 183 (1984) (finding that
tight fiscal constraints result in longer strike durations).
304. See Montgomery & Benedict, supra note 23, at 380. One may speculate that
the increased bargaining activity after the Illinois and Ohio statutes were enacted
might indicate an increase in the number of bargaining units with inexperienced
negotiators. To the extent that this is true, one would expect the lack of experience to
lead to greater strike frequencies. If this is the case, the failure to account for
negotiator experience would underestimate the relationship between the change in the
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Third, the pre-Act data in both states are not completely
comparable to the post-Act data. The pre-Act Ohio data may
include some strikes by employees who now have the right to
go to interest arbitration, such as nurses and employees of the
state schools for the blind and deaf and the state retirement
system. °5 To the extent that such strikes are included, the
data overstate the number of pre-Act strikes and overestimate
the effect of the statute in decreasing strike frequency. On the
other hand, the Illinois pre-Act data covered only K-12 teachers
and, therefore, may exclude pre-Act strikes by employees who
now have the right to strike. To the extent that such strikes
are not included, the Illinois data understate the number of
pre-Act strikes and underestimate the effect of the statute in
decreasing strike frequency.
Finally, the data may overestimate the effect of legalizing
public employee strikes on decreasing strike frequency because
the data do not distinguish between strikes over bargaining
impasses and strikes over recognition. In addition to legalizing
strikes, the Illinois and Ohio statutes provide procedures
whereby a union may force recognition by petitioning for and
winning a representation election conducted by the labor
board.3"' There is strong evidence that by reducing the union's
need to resort to self-help to force recognition, comprehensive
public employee collective bargaining statutes reduce strikes
over recognition as well as strikes over the parties' first
collective bargaining agreement.
Indiana, for example, has a comprehensive collective
bargaining statute governing public education," 7 but does not
have a similar statute governing the remainder of the public
sector. Recognition strikes in public education are virtually
nonexistent, but occur frequently in the rest of the public
sector.30 8 Similarly, recognition strikes in Ohio and Illinois
laws and the decrease in strike activity.
305. See supra text accompanying note 132.
306. 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, § 8 (1992); Osio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07 (Anderson
1991).
307. IND. CODE § 20-7.5 (1976).
308. See OLSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 261 (finding that from 1974 to 1977, 290
teacher bargaining units were recognized without any recognition strikes, while during
the same period, 35 new bargaining units were recognized in local governments with
three recognition strikes (approximately eight percent), but not indicating how many
of the other recognitions might have been prompted by a strike threat).
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during the 1970s occurred significantly more often than in the
rest of the country.0 9
Undoubtedly, some of the reduction in strike incidence in
Illinois and Ohio resulted from taking the fight over recognition
out of the streets and placing it before the labor boards. It is
not likely, however, that this accounts for most of the reduction.
Indeed, the IELRA replaced a 1981 amendment to the Illinois
School Code that provided a procedure for recognition elections
in teacher bargaining units.310  Although the 1981 law
contained no express duty to bargain and no enforcement
procedure, it probably reduced recognition strikes, albeit not to
the same extent as a comprehensive statute such as the IELRA.
Reasonable theoretical grounds exist for believing that
legalizing strikes may reduce the number of strikes overall.
Artificial strike prohibitions distort the communication value of
the union's strike threat. While at the bargaining table, unions
threatening an illegal strike usually maintain that they are
fully prepared to deal with the consequences of the strike's
illegality. Employers may excessively discount such
representations, thereby underestimating the settlement that
the union is willing to accept. A lawful and credible strike
threat is a great incentive for peaceful settlement.311
Eliminating artificial strike prohibitions may promote more
realistic bargaining.
The data presented in this Article, however, do not firmly
support a conclusion that the legalization of public employee
strikes in Illinois and Ohio caused their frequency to decrease.
On the other hand, there is no evidence that legalization caused
strikes to increase in frequency. All of the evidence is to the
contrary. Part I of this Article concluded, for normative
reasons, that reliance on a right to strike is preferable to both
interest arbitration and nonbinding fact-finding as a method for
resolving public employee bargaining impasses. Legislators and
other policymakers may take heart from the experiences in
309. During the period from 1974 to 1977, 21% of Illinois' public sector strikes and
17% of Ohio's concerned recognition or the negotiation of a first contract, as compared
to 12.1% for the rest of the country. Id. at 309. During this period, over 12% of new
bargaining relationships in Illinois and over 14% in Ohio followed a strike, compared
with 2.9% in the rest of the country. Id. at 310-11.
310. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, para. 3-14.24 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (repealed in 1984
by the IELRA).
311. This is evident in the ratio of strike notices to actual strikes under the IELRA.
Depending on the year, the ratio ranges from 5.73:1 to 2.42:1, demonstrating that the
strike notice itself dramatically pressures settlement. See supra Table 6.
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Illinois and Ohio and may grant public employees a legal right
to strike without fear that doing so will lead to.an increase in
strike frequency.
B. Mandatory Prestrike Fact-Finding
Legislatures which decide to recognize public employees' right
to strike have several models from which to choose. A key issue
which they must confront is whether (and if so, under what
circumstances) to require fact-finding as a condition for a lawful
strike. States which mandate exhaustion of fact-finding
procedures before a union may lawfully strike assume that such
action will reduce strikes. A study of private sector strikes in
Canada found that prestrike fact-finding significantly reduced
strike activity.312 Ohio reinforces the use of fact-finding to
prevent strikes by making it procedurally cumbersome to reject
the fact finder's recommendations.313
Ohio and other states that rely on fact-finding to prevent
strikes face a dilemma. Fact-finding is nonbinding interest
arbitration. Fact-finder recommendations, like interest
arbitration awards, are based primarily on considerations of
comparability, and fact finders are just as reluctant as interest
arbitrators to change the status quo.314 To the extent that a
state succeeds in having fact-finder recommendations accepted
or deemed accepted, the state substitutes an adjudicatory
system for traditional collective bargaining to set terms and
conditions of employment and thus risks the same
disadvantages that accompany interest arbitration.315
The nonbinding nature of fact-finding acts as a safety valve.
A party that strongly desires to change the status quo or to
312. Morley Gunderson et al., The Effect of Labour Relations Legislation on Strike
Incidence, 22 CAN. J. ECON. 779 (1989).
313. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. The principal exception is
where the fact finder serves as a supermediator. Unfortunately, time limits inhibit use
of the supermediator model. See JACKSON, supra note 56, at 37-38. There is no reason
why aggressive mediation cannot be used without having to place it in a fact-finding
context. The main advantage that the fact finder/supermediator offers over
conventional mediation is the ability to make an agreed upon settlement more palatable
politically by embodying it in a fact finder's recommendations. Nothing, however,
prohibits parties in mediation from voluntarily proceeding to fact-finding for the
purpose of embodying an agreed upon outcome in formal recommendations.
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resist a settlement comparable to other employers can make its
wishes known early in the negotiations and indicate its
willingness to lose the issue in fact-finding, reject the fact
finder's recommendations and, if necessary, strike or take a
strike. Thus, bargaining under the fact-finding, right-to-strike
model is more realistic than bargaining under interest
arbitration. Unfortunately, the injection of a mandatory fact-
finding procedure appears to affect efforts to avoid and settle a
strike. Tables 9 and 10 compare strike durations in Illinois,
which does not mandate prestrike fact-finding, and Ohio, which
does.
Only one out of 126 strikes in Illinois exceeded thirty
days-the 1986-87 Homer School District strike which
consumed most of the school year. In Ohio, seventeen strikes,
representing 15.45% of the total strikes and 16.83% of the total
authorized strikes, exceeded thirty days.
Not only are strikes more likely to be lengthy in Ohio, they
also are less likely to settle quickly. Almost two-thirds of the
strikes in Illinois (63.54%) settled within ten days or less. In
Ohio, less than half (45.54%) of the authorized strikes settled
within ten days or less.316
A chi square (X2) analysis of strike durations in Illinois and
Ohio confirms that strikes last significantly longer in Ohio. By
using Tables 9 and 10 to compare the frequency of strike
duration by five-day intervals in each state, a result was
obtained that is significant at a confidence level below .01.
3 17
316. The authorized strikes provide the appropriate comparison. Unauthorized
strikes will always end in five days or less because the statute requires the OSERB to
rule on a strike investigation petition within 72 hours. Even this figure inflates the
number of strikes settled within five days. One of the authorized strikes which ended
in less than five days ended by injunction rather than agreement. Three of the strikes
which lasted five days or less were brought by the same union against the same
employer within a three week period and justifiably could be treated as a single strike
with a total length of two days and one hour. See supra Table 10 and accompanying
notes.
317. I am grateful to my colleague Kevin Smith for guiding me through the chi
square (X2 ) analysis. To compute a chi square analysis of strike durations in Illinois
and Ohio, the percentages of strikes at five-day intervals provided in Tables 9 and 10
can be compared as follows:
0-5 16-10 11-15 16-20 121-25 26-301 Over 30
Days Days Days Days Days Days Days
Illinois 24.60 38.94 19.05 10.32 4.78 1.59 0.79
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In other words, it is more than ninety-nine percent certain that
the differences in strike durations in Ohio and Illinois did not
occur by chance.
There is reason to believe that this difference may be
attributable to Ohio's requirement of fact-finding. Although
Ohio's fact-finding process has contributed to the settlement of
many contracts without a strike, it also is likely that when a
party rejects a fact finder's report and a strike ensues, the fact-
finding process adds to the difficulty of settling the strike. A
fact-finding hearing is litigation and is therefore adversarial in
nature. Parties are likely to perceive the fact finder's report in
terms of whether they have won or lost. Certainly, a party that
votes to reject a fact finder's report believes that it has lost.
The party that has not rejected it is likely to react by saying,
"Why should I change anything? A neutral objective fact finder
found what is right and fair."
Thus, the fact-finding may serve to further polarize the
parties, making the impasse more difficult to settle. This
polarization can be particularly acute if the party that did not
reject the fact finder's report views the report as vindicating its
position. For example, one commentator who has written
extensively on the Ohio statute reported a management
negotiator's feelings of elation when he won the fact-finding
followed by his frustration when the union rejected the report
and engaged in a seventeen-day strike.31 At a minimum, the
requirement of fact-finding injects a new issue at the
The chi square (X2) calculation is as follows, where 0 is the observed frequency of strike
durations at each five-day interval in Illinois and Ohio and E is the expected frequency
if the state in which the strike occurred made no difference:
E
(24.60-26.64)2 + (38.94_27.89)2 + (19.05-19.43? + (10.32-8.63)
2 + (4.78-5.85)2
26.64 27.89 19.43 8.63 5.85
+ (1.59-2.28? + (0.79-8.81)2 + (28.67-26.64) + (16.83-27.89)
2 + (19.80-19.43)2
2.28 8.81 26.64 27.89 19.43
+ (6.93-8.63? + (6.93-5.85V + (2.97-2.28)2 + (16.83-8.81)2
8.63 5.85 2.28 8.81
=25.1694
318. James T. O'Reilly, Ohio Begins Public Sector Bargaining: "The Best of Times"
Lies Ahead, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 426, 450 (1985) (discussing interviews with
negotiators in Ohio and warning that mandatory fact-finding might disrupt the
bargaining process and inhibit agreements).
383WINTER 1993]
384 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:2
bargaining table-why should we deviate from the fact finder's
recommendations?-which diverts attention from the settlement
issues. The fact-finding also may polarize the parties further
and make it more difficult for the party that did not reject the
fact finder's recommendation to change its position.
The polarization and hardening of positions that results from
the rejection of a fact finder's report may be exacerbated by the
statutory requirement that the OSERB publicize the fact
finder's report. It is even more difficult for a party to back
away from a position upheld by the fact finder when the fact
finder's report is made public.319
Apparently, many in Ohio have concluded that prestrike fact-
finding is not conducive to dispute resolution. Professor
Portaro's survey found that 27.1% of Ohio public employers
"strongly disagreed" and 32.2% "disagreed" with the fact-finding
procedure.320 Over half of the bargaining units in Ohio have
adopted MADs, and most of these dispense with fact-finding.
3 21
Because half of Ohio's bargaining units have opted out of the
statutory impasse procedures and most of those have opted out
of fact-finding, it is necessary to investigate the Ohio experience
further. Fortunately, the OSERB's files reveal, for most strikes,
whether the bargaining unit proceeded under the statute or
under a MAD. Tables 11 through 14 analyze the Ohio strike
data according to the type of impasse procedure used by the
parties.
As can be seen from Tables 12 and 13, strikes are more
prevalent under MADs than under the statutory procedures.
This result is not surprising in light of the statutory procedural
hurdles to rejection of fact-finder recommendations.322
Interestingly, strikes undertaken pursuant to MADs have
almost the same chance of settling quickly as strikes under the
statutory procedure: 46.46% of authorized strikes under the
statutory procedures ended within ten days. If the three
University of Cincinnati strikes are treated as a single strike,
319. The theory behind requiring fact-finding holds just the opposite, that is, that
the fact finder's recommendations will cause the parties to reevaluate their positions.
In a study of the use of prestrike fact-finding in Ontario, Canada, however, 50% of the
parties reported that fact-finding did not cause them to change their positions, while
another 45.1% reported that they changed their positions only to a slight degree.
JACKSON, supra note 56, at 49.
320. Portaro, Public-Sector Impasse Legislation, supra note 288, at 123.
321. Telephone Interview with Thomas Worley, Administrator, Bureau of Mediation,
Ohio State Employment Relations Board (June 26, 1990).




Year MAD Statute Unknown Total
1984 1 0 3 4
1985 6 3 0 9
1986 10 4 0 14
1987 11 5 2 18
1988 8 6 0 14
1989 13 5 1 19
1990 11 3 0 14
1991 13 6 0 19
1992 3 1 0 4
Total 76 33 6 115
I acknowledge the efforts of my research assistant Stan Gosch who obtained
the relevant data from the Ohio State Employment Relations Board and
compiled this table and Tables 12-14.
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this percentage drops to 42.36. By comparison, 45.71% of
authorized strikes under MADs ended within ten days. The
strikes that occur under the statutory procedures, however, are
more likely to be lengthy and difficult to settle than those
which occur under MADs. Over one-fourth (28.57%) of
authorized strikes under the statutory procedures took longer
than thirty days to settle. If the three "quickie" strikes at the
University of Cincinnati are treated as a single, forty-nine-hour
strike, the percentage of authorized strikes lasting over thirty
days increases to 30.80. In contrast, 12.33% of authorized
strikes under MADs lasted longer than 30 days.
Using the frequencies from Tables 12 and 13, a chi square
(X2) analysis can be computed to compare the significance of
strike durations under an Ohio MAD and under the statutory
procedures. 323  The result is significant at a confidence level
below .025. In other words, the probability is less than 2.5%
that the difference in the durations of strikes under MADs,
which usually are not preceded by fact-finding, and strikes
323. To compute a chi square (X2) analysis of strike durations under MADs and the
statutory procedures, the percentages of authorized strikes at five-day intervals
provided in Tables 12 and 13 can be compared as follows:
I0-5 16-10 111-15 1 16-20 12 1-25 1 26-30 1Over1
Days Days Days Days Days Days 30
MADs 27.14 18.57 18.57 7.14 8.57 5.71 12.86
Statute 32.14 14.29 14.29 7.14 3.58 0 28.57
The chi square (X2) calculation is as follows, where 0 is the observed frequency of strike
durations at each five-day interval under MADs or the statutory procedures and E is







+ (18.57-16.43)2 (18.57-16.43)2 (7.14-7.14)
2 , (8.57-6.07V
29.64 16.43 16.43 7.14 6.075
+ (5.71-2.855)2 + (12.86-20.615)2 + (32.14-29.64)
2 + (14.29-16.43)
2 + (14.29-16.43)2
2.855 20.615 29.64 16.43 16.43
+ (7.14-7.14)2 + (3.586.075)2 + (0-2.855)2 + (28.57-20.615)2
7.14 6.075 2.855 20.615
=15.002
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under the statutory procedure requiring fact-finding is the
result of chance.
The experience in Pennsylvania further suggests that
prestrike fact-finding results in longer strikes. Prior to the
1992 amendments governing teacher strikes, the PLRB had
discretion to invoke fact-finding when mediation failed to
produce an agreement. As a matter of policy, the PLRB
invoked fact-finding only when the parties or the mediator
indicated that it would be helpful. 24 Tables 15 and 16, derived
from reports in the PLRB's files, compare the durations of
strikes in the absence of fact-finding with strikes following fact-
finding.
Pennsylvania's experience confirms the lessons from Ohio.
Whereas 45.59% of strikes without fact-finding settled within
ten days, only 28.58% of strikes after fact-finding ended that
quickly. Further, strikes after fact-finding were just as likely
to last more than thirty days as they were to settle within ten
days. Strikes without fact-finding were almost four times as
likely to settle within ten days than to last more than thirty
days. Less than one-eighth (12.25%) of strikes without fact-
finding lasted more than thirty days.
A chi square (X2) analysis of the differences in strike
durations in Pennsylvania with and without prestrike fact-
finding can be computed using the frequencies from Tables 15
and 16.325 The result is significant at the .05 confidence level.
324. See supra text accompanying note 223.
325. To compute a chi square (X2) analysis of strike durations with and without
prestrike fact-finding, the percentages of strikes at five-day intervals provided in Tables
15 and 16 can be compared as follows:
I 0-5 16-1011-15 16-20121-25126-30] Over 301_____Days JDays JDays JDays Days jDays jDays
With 28.57
fact- 14.29 14.29 7.14 14.29 7.14 14.29
finding
Without 12.25
fact- 25.49 20.10 11.76 9.80 10.29 10.29
finding I I I
The chi square (X 2) calculation is as follows, where 0 is the observed frequency of strike
durations at each five-day interval with and without fact-finding and E is the expected
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In other words, the probability of the differences in
Pennsylvania strike durations occurring by chance is only five
percent. Although the small sample size for strikes after fact-
finding calls for caution in relying on the Pennsylvania data
alone, the data are consistent with the quantitative and
qualitative analyses of the experiences in Ohio and Illinois.
Mandatory prestrike fact-finding makes strikes more difficult
to settle.
Oregon's experience with fact-finding differs from
Pennsylvania's and Ohio's. Oregon has experienced very few
strikes. Although the OERB's data on strike duration are
incomplete, the data show only one strike that lasted more than
thirty days-a seventy-six work day strike in 1981 against
Portland.326 Table 17 presents bargaining data collected and
tabulated from the OERB's files.
There appear to have been 591 fact-finding recommendations.
Of these, ninety-eight (16.58%) were accepted by the parties as
their agreed upon settlement, while only twenty-seven (4.57%)
resulted in strikes. The remaining 466 (78.85%) were settled
in mediation after fact-finding, presumably on terms differing
from the recommendations.
How has Oregon been able to avoid the lengthy strikes which
characterize post-fact-finding conduct in Ohio and
Pennsylvania? Oregon's procedures incorporate a significantly
longer waiting period between the publication of rejected fact-
finder recommendations and the date upon which a lawful
strike may begin.327 This longer waiting period may allow
positions hardened by fact-finding to soften and may enable the
parties to compromise without a lengthy strike.




2 + (7.14_9.45)2 + (14.29-12.04) + (7.14-8.715)2
19.89 17.195 9.45 12.045 8.715
+ (14.29-12.29)2 + (28.51-20.38)2 + (25.49_19.89)2 + (20.10-17.195)2 
+ (11.76-9.45)2
12.29 20.38 19.89 17.195 9.45
+ (9.80-12.045)2 + (10.29-8.715)2 + (10.29-12.29? + (12.25-20.38)?
12.045 8.715 12.29 20.38
=13.8075
326. Information provided by the Oregon Employment Relations Board, Conciliation
Service Division.
327. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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is a policy that is damned if it works and damned if it fails. To
the extent that it succeeds in preventing strikes, it functions
considerably like interest arbitration. As with interest
arbitration, strikes are prevented at a cost of innovation and
problem solving in bargaining. 28 When it fails, it introduces
new issues into the bargaining process, hardens attitudes, and
makes compromise more difficult. Although many factors may
contribute to the duration of a particular strike,3 29 requiring
prestrike fact-finding increases the likelihood of longer strikes.
Thus, mandating prestrike fact-finding does not appear to be a
sound policy.
IV. INJUNCTIONS AND RELATED MEDDLING
Parts I through III show that states should recognize public
employees' right to strike and that states should not regulate
the strike by imposing prestrike fact-finding. In other words,
impasse resolution in the public sector should approximate
impasse resolution in the private sector.33 ° Even in the private
sector, however, reliance on the right to strike is not absolute.
Some strikes so endanger the public interest that they may be
enjoined.33' Legislatures that recognize public employees' right
to strike also must face the injunction issue.
Strike injunction petitions place judges in no-win situations.
These judges recognize that they are being used by the parties
to further their bargaining positions and not simply to resolve
a legal dispute.332 Sometimes the judge's decision on the
328. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., Robert C. Rodgers & JeffreyD. Strausmann, What Factors Contribute
to the Duration of Strikes by Public Employees, 6 INVL J. PUB. ADMIN. 183 (1984).
330. Issues such as the regulation of employer economic weapons and whether to
mandate prestrike mediation are beyond the scope of this Article.
331. See 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1988).
332. A trial court judge in Pennsylvania, ruling on a school district's injunction
petition under the clear and present danger to the public welfare standard, aptly
summarized the sentiments of many judges in strike injunction cases:
If the court issues an injunction, it is unlikely that the demands of the public-
school teacher will be met. Should the court refuse to grant the injunction, the
public employer may capitulate to the demands. The public employer then blames
the court for forcing it to agree to unreasonable demands by the union. Neither
result is in the public interest.... A trial judge is placed by PERA (Public
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injunction request is influenced strongly by the judge's view of
the merits of the underlying bargaining dispute.3 3 The broader
the standard for issuance of an injunction, the greater the
court's discretion and the greater the likelihood that the judge's
attitude toward collective bargaining will affect the outcome.334
Often judges react to their no-win positions by involving
themselves in the parties' negotiations. Much of the predecision
process takes place in chambers rather than in open court, as
the judge attempts to get a feel for and settle the dispute.335
Judges commonly enter the negotiations ; actively as
supermediators in an attempt to settle the collective bargaining
agreement. 336  Because most state trial judges are elected
officials, they also may feel political pressure to mediate the
contract talks rather than adjudicate the injunction request.
3 7
Armed with the power to grant or deny the injunction
request, a judge may be able to apply more pressure to the
parties than a traditional labor relations mediator. Most
judges, however, probably have little or no training or expertise
in labor relations. Collective bargaining mediation differs
Employee Relations Act) in a position that is not only untenable but also one that
requires more of a political and economic result than a judicial decision.
DAVID L. COLTON & EDI E. GRABEP TACHER SRIKES AND THE COUT' 105 (1982) (quoting
Butler Area Sch. Dist. v. Butler Educ. Ass'n, 9 Pa. Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press)
9039, at 75, 76 (C.P. 1978) (deletion in the original)).
333. For example, in one case, a judge rejected an employer's claim that a strike by
water and sewage treatment workers endangered the public health and sounded like
a cheerleader for the union: "The day will soon be gone when a public employe, be he
a teacher, a utility worker or a sanitation department employe, will be forced to
supplement his income with a 'moonlighting' job or by applying for food stamps."
Highland Sewer & Water Auth. v. IBEW Local 459, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 564, 568 (C.P.
1973).
334. See Bernard C. Brominski, Limited Right to Strike Laws-Can They Work
When Applied to Public Education? From the Perspective of the Local Judge, 2 J.L. &
EDUC. 677, 683-84 (1973) (observing that the vagueness of the injunction standard in
Pennsylvania coupled with varying judicial attitudes toward teacher collective
bargaining led to inconsistent results in Pennsylvania injunction cases).
335. See COLTON & GRABER, supra note 333, at 97-99.
336. See DAVIS & FISCHER, supra note 23, at 64; Brominski, supra note 335, at
686-87 (raising the issue ofjudicial mediation); Charles Redenius, Participant Attitudes
Toward a Judicial Role in Public Employee Collective Bargaining, 25 LAB. L.J. 94, 98
(1974) (conducting a survey of Wisconsin trial judges which found them divided over
whether they should mediate the parties' contract negotiations or simply limit
themselves to adjudicating the injunction petition).
337. See Redenius, supra note 337, at 99. For a further discussion of the use of




significantly from the mediation of traditional litigation.33
More importantly, if the judge remains unsuccessful in bringing
the parties to an agreement, she still has to rule on the merits
of the injunction request. It is extremely difficult for any
person to cast aside the view of the parties' dispute that she
developed during mediation and resolve the injunction dispute
objectively. Even if the judge is able to do so, the parties,
particularly the losing party, likely will doubt whether the
result was truly objective and impartial.
A standard which makes it relatively easy to enjoin a lawful
strike thus strains the judicial process. It also may have the
ironic effect of encouraging strikes and discouraging settlement
through bilateral agreement by reducing the fear of the
consequences of a strike. These consequences include the short-
term inconveniences and economic and political costs that
accompany a strike. They also include recognition that, once
begun, a strike may escalate out of control and inflict lasting
damage to all parties. Fear of such uncontrolled escalation also
pressures the parties once a strike begins, adding a sense of
urgency to settle the strike before it engenders lasting damage.
The role of uncertainty regarding strike consequences in
pressuring settlements can be seen clearly in Illinois, where the
standard for enjoining lawful strikes is quite narrow.339 The
only lawful strike in Illinois which lasted more than thirty days
began on October 17, 1986, when the Homer Association of
Teachers struck against the Homer School District 208. The
strike involved a bargaining unit of thirty teachers who served
approximately 360 students in rural Champaign County. It
lasted 143 days and was not settled until after the end of the
1986-87 school year. The resulting contract did not resolve two
of the issues involved in the strike-the salary schedule and
whether teachers would advance a step on that salary
schedule.340
338. In most litigation, the conclusion of the litigation also ends the relationship
between the parties. Collective bargaining is distinct because the parties have a
continuous relationship and neither party has the ability to walk away from the other.
Once a contract is settled, the parties must return to the workplace together and again
will face each other across the bargaining table when the time comes to negotiate a
successor contract.
339. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
340. For a detailed discussion and analysis of the Homer strike, see Martin H.
Malin, Collective Bargaining Laws in Ohio and Illinois: An Analysis of the Six-Year
History of the Newest Public Sector Labor Laws 30-37 (July 23, 1990) (unpublished
manuscript, presented to the Association of Labor Relations Agencies, 39th Annual
Conference, Cincinnati, Ohio) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
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Everyone lost in Homer.3" The 1300 residents of the
community had a disastrous year with their schools. The school
district lost a substantial percentage of its state aid. The school
district no longer exists, merging with the district on its
southern boundary, although there is disagreement over
whether the strike contributed to this. Four school board
members who were up for reelection either chose not to run or
were defeated. The other three, including the chair, sought
seats on the board of the merged district. One was elected; the
chair, who had been the district's chief negotiator, was defeated.
The teachers forfeited almost an entire year's pay and,
probably, a step advancement on the salary schedule. At least
eight left the district during the strike. By the time the district
merged, only eight or nine of the strikers remained.
The Homer strike had a dramatic impact on other teacher
negotiations, especially in small school districts. The Homer
strike is notorious in Illinois. It demonstrated that a small
school district can, at great cost, replace striking teachers and
cause them great financial harm. It also showed the state-wide
union organization's willingness to invest a large amount of
money on behalf of a tiny local. It showed both sides that there
is much to fear in a strike. Indeed, many fear that a long
strike in a small district means the death of that district.
Homer increased the incentive for parties to settle at the
bargaining table. In fact, only six strikes disrupted Illinois
public education in each of the two years following the Homer
strike.342
The concerns with uncertainty that pressure Illinois
negotiators to settle contrast markedly with the situation in
Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania's provision to enjoin strikes which
endanger the public welfare has resulted in courts enjoining
teacher strikes when it becomes impossible to make up enough
strike days to meet the state's requirement of 180 instructional
341. The following discussion of the Homer strike and its impact on collective
bargaining in Illinois public education is drawn from Malin, supra note 341.
342. See supra Table 6. In Wisconsin, a very bitter, long strike in the Hortonville
School District might have had a similar effect on teacher bargaining in subsequent
years. Craig A. Olson, Strikes, Strike Penalties and Arbitration in Six States, 39 INDus.
& LAB. REL. REv. 538, 542, 550 (1986).
days.3 3 The availability of injunctions as soon as a strike
persists long enough to endanger state aid ensures that the
strike will not escalate out of control. If the court enjoins the
strike just in time to make up the lost days, teachers and school
districts suffer little or no net economic losses. Thus,
Pennsylvania's clear and present danger to the public welfare
standard for enjoining lawful strikes reduces the uncertainty
which parties face when considering the consequences of a
strike.34 Under Act 195, the only risk of the strike escalating
out of control was that the employer would not seek an
injunction. The recent Pennsylvania amendments appear to
eliminate even this minor risk by outlawing teacher strikes
once it becomes impossible to make up the strike days and
providing for the Pennsylvania Secretary of Education to seek
injunctions against those strikes that persist.345
The ease of enjoining a lawful strike not only increases the
probability of having a strike, but it may also reduce the
urgency for settling a strike. As strike-induced losses mount
and the parties approach the point where the strike will cause
substantial damage, their interests in cutting losses and
avoiding further damage increase the pressure to settle.
Where, however, the result of continuing the strike is not the
risk of greatly escalating losses, but rather a judicial back-to-
work order, the pressure and sense of urgency to settle is
diminished.346
343. See supra notes 254-257 and accompanying text. Allowing injunctions when
strikes endanger the public welfare instead of limiting injunctions to strikes that
endanger public health and safety makes injunctions more available outside of public
education, too. For example, the public welfare standard makes it much easier to
enjoin public transit strikes. Compare Masloffv. Port Auth., 613 A.2d 1186 (Pa. 1992),
with Central Ohio Transit Auth., 4 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. (Lab. Rel. Press) 4040,
at VII-58 (Ohio St. Empl. Rel. Bd. 1987).
344. See OLSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 160 (finding that knowledge that the employer
would seek an injunction provoked and prolonged teacher strikes in Pennsylvania).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 269-70.
346. The negotiators may covertly welcome the injunction. It relieves them of
having to make the difficult compromises necessary to end the strike. The employer
gets the workforce back without having to make further bargaining concessions. The
union leadership, instead of making further concessions that recognize employer
resistance, can return to work without a contract and blame the judge for saving the
employer with an injunction. Of course, if the union believes that it will ultimately
win, it can defy the injunction, thereby escalating the controversy further and injecting
a new issue-amnesty from a contempt proceeding. Such a course of action occurred
in the 1973 Philadelphia teachers strike. For discussions by three of the principals in
that strike, see Philip Davidoff, The Limited Right to Strike Laws-Can They Work
When Applied to Public Education? A School Board Member's Perspective, 2 J.L. &
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The Illinois and Ohio approaches to enjoining lawful public
employee strikes have much to commend them. First, both
states confine injunctions to the very narrow group of strikes
that pose a clear and present danger to public health and
safety.3 47  Thus, they do not allow injunctive relief to
significantly reduce the uncertainties of a strike's consequences
and, accordingly, maintain maximum pressure on the parties to
settle. Second, Ohio and Illinois place primary responsibility
for determining whether a clear and present danger exists on
the labor boards and provide specific procedures for resolving
postinjunction bargaining impasses. 8 Thus, they remove the
primary decision regarding whether to issue an injunction from
the potentially politically-charged atmosphere of the state trial
courts, thereby removing many of the concerns that tempt
judges in other jurisdictions to mediate the contract talks. The
judge's role is confined to a purely judicial function-reviewing
the labor board's determination, issuing the injunction, and
sending the parties to the next phase of the statutory
procedures.
CONCLUSION
Public sector labor relations have come a long way since
Franklin Delano Roosevelt maintained categorically that public
employees were not entitled to the same rights that he signed
into law for private sector workers. States have experimented
with a wide variety of approaches to resolving collective
bargaining impasses.
Experience shows that granting public employees the right to
strike is an appropriate policy. Public employee strikes do not
distort the democratic process as once was feared. Fact-finding
coupled with artificial strike prohibitions do not provide a real
alternative to the right to strike. States which supposedly rely
on fact-finding actually rely on the strike to motivate the
parties to settle. Interest arbitration does provide a true strike
substitute, but it is a poor one, tending to stifle innovation and
EDUC. 689 (1973); Thomas H. Lane, The Limited Right to Strike Laws-Can They Work
When Applied to Public Education? From the Perspective of a School Board Attorney,
2 J.L. & EDUC. 703 (1973); Leonard M. Sagot & Thomas W. Jennings, The Limited Right
to Strike Laws-Can They Work When Applied to Public Education? From the
Perspective of a Union Attorney, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 715 (1973).
347. See supra notes 123-28, 167-71 and accompanying text.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 124, 167.
400
Right to Strike
creative problem solving in negotiations. Experiences in Illinois
and Ohio show that legalizing public employee strikes does not
cause an increase in strikes and may encourage more realistic
bargaining.
Legislatures which recognize public employees' right to strike
should subject them to only minimal regulation. Mandatory
prestrike fact-finding, currently imposed in several states,
carries with it the danger of stifling bargaining in much the
same way as interest arbitration, while making those strikes
which do occur more difficult to settle. If fact-finding is not
required, most strikes will settle quickly. Those strikes that do
not settle quickly usually should be allowed to run their
courses. Liberal standards for strike injunctions cause more
harm than good. They strain the judiciary and reduce the
incentives to settle at the bargaining table. An injunction
standard narrowly confined to strikes which endanger public
health and safety, applied in the first instance by a labor
relations board rather than a court, and coupled with specific
poststrike impasse resolution procedures, relieves the strain on
the judiciary and maximizes incentives to settle at the
bargaining table.
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